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619 
PARENS PATRIAE AND THE DISINHERITED CHILD 
Michael J. Higdon* 
Abstract: Most countries have safeguards in place to protect children from disinheritance. 
The United States is not one of them. Since its founding, America has clung tightly to the ideal 
of testamentary freedom, refusing to erect any barriers to a testator’s ability to disinherit his or 
her children—regardless of the child’s age or financial needs. Over the years, however, 
disinheritance has become more common given the evolving American family, specifically the 
increased incidences of divorce, remarriage, and cohabitation. Critics of the American 
approach have offered up reforms based largely on the two models currently employed by 
other countries: (1) the forced heirship approach, in which all children are entitled to a set 
percentage of their parent’s estate; and (2) family maintenance statutes, which provide judges 
with the discretionary authority to override a testator’s wishes and instead award some portion 
of the estate to the testator’s surviving family members. This Article takes a different approach 
and looks at the issue of disinheritance through a new lens: the doctrine of parens patriae. Just 
as this doctrine limits the decision-making autonomy of living parents vis-à-vis their children, 
this Article argues that it should likewise limit the dead hand control of deceased parents. 
Focusing on minor children, adult children who remain dependent as a result of disability, and 
adult children who are survivors of parental abuse, it is the contention of this Article that 
testamentary freedom must sometimes yield to the state’s inherent parens patriae authority to 
protect children from harm. Specifically, this Article proposes that courts must refuse 
enforcement of testamentary schemes that disinherit children who fall into those categories if 
that disinheritance would constitute abuse or neglect. Such an approach is not only mandated 
by the doctrine of parens patriae but, in contrast to the approaches other countries have adopted, 
is much more deferential to testamentary freedom. The limitations imposed by this proposal 
represent a relatively modest curtailment of the rights testators currently possess and, at the 
same time, are consistent with existing exceptions to testamentary freedom, most notably those 
in place to protect spouses and creditors as well as those that prohibit the enforcement of 
testamentary provisions that violate public policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“[W]hen it comes to inheritance, 
American children are in need of a champion.”1 
 
In 2013, J.C. Cole died leaving behind an estate valued at $15 million.2 
Two days before he died, J.C. executed a will that disinherited his only 
child, Karla: “It is my intention to make no provision in this Will for 
[Karla] or her heirs, whom I have no relationship with in the past or at this 
time.”3 In an attempt to have the will set aside, Karla brought suit claiming 
that her father had sexually abused her as a child, and after confronting 
him about the abuse as an adult, he retaliated by writing her out of the 
will.4 Karla argued that her father’s will violated public policy—
specifically, the state’s “clear, unequivocal, and unbending . . . hostility 
toward sexual abuse of minors.”5 Karla’s factual allegations were 
“vigorously disputed,”6 but ultimately the facts would be of no 
consequence given that the Texas court dismissed her complaint as having 
no basis in law. The court did so by noting that state law “confer[s] upon 
                                                   
1. Deborah A. Batts, I Didn’t Ask to Be Born: The American Law of Disinheritance and A Proposal 
for Change to A System of Protected Inheritance, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1197, 1197 (1990). 
2. Merrick v. Helter, 500 S.W.3d 671, 672 n.1 (Tex. App. 2016). 
3. Id. at 674. 
4. Id. at 672. 
5. Id. at 674 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
6. Id. at 672. The executor “asserted not only a general denial but also [alleged that Karla] had filed 
a false and groundless pleading knowingly in an attempt to harass, intimidate, and ‘defraud’ [the 
executor] into abandoning the probate proceedings.” Id. 
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the testator full power freely to make any disposition he desire[s] to make 
of his property,” and “whether he exercised the right he possessed wisely 
or unwisely, justly or unjustly, is not for the courts to determine.”7 Thus, 
according to the court, Karla’s father was free to disinherit her even if that 
disinheritance stemmed from his sexual abuse of her as a child. 
The ruling in Karla’s case is not the product of some idiosyncratic 
Texas law, but instead is emblematic of the American approach to 
succession in general. In forty-nine states, parents have the right “to 
disinherit their children and grandchildren for any reason or no reason”8—
a right that has existed since the country’s founding.9 Although early legal 
philosophers, most notable of whom was John Locke, would take the 
position that inheritance was a natural right,10 others advocated for a more 
positivistic approach. Blackstone, for instance, wrote in his Commentaries 
that inheritance was “no natural, but merely a civil right,” cautioning that 
“we [not] mistake for nature what we find established by long and 
inveterate custom.”11 By the time the United States came into existence, 
the positivistic approach had prevailed and ever since has “dominated this 
country’s thinking on inheritance.”12 In 1898, the Supreme Court would 
declare that “[t]he right to take property by devise or descent is the 
creature of the law, and not a natural right.”13 
It is against that backdrop that American inheritance law has evolved 
into a system that is “without parallel elsewhere in the western world”14—
one that prioritizes testamentary freedom even at the expense of a 
testator’s children. In the United States today, a testator “can disinherit 
minor, disabled, and unborn children without cause or remedy.”15 As other 
                                                   
7. Id. at 675 (quoting Perry v. Rogers, 114 S.W. 897, 898 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908)). 
8. Joshua C. Tate, Caregiving and the Case for Testamentary Freedom, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
129, 131 (2008). Louisiana is the one state that does have some protections for children, but even they 
are quite limited. See infra notes 147–153 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra notes 89–92 and accompanying text. 
10. Jacqueline Asadorian, Disinheritance of Minor Children: A Proposal to Amend the Uniform 
Probate Code, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 101, 101 (2011) (“God Planted in Men a strong 
desire . . . of propagating their Kind, and continuing themselves in their Posterity, and this gives 
Children a Title, to share in the Property of their Parents, and a Right to Inherit their Possessions.”) 
(quoting JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 206–07 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1988) (1690)). 
11. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *11. 
12. Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 77 (1990); see also Stanley 
N. Katz, Republicanism and the Law of Inheritance in the American Revolutionary Era, 76 MICH. L. 
REV. 1, 8 (1977–1978) (“American state and federal courts since the foundation of the new nation 
have been equally committed to the positivist argument.”). 
13. Magoun v. Ill. Tr. & Sav. Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 288 (1898). 
14. Adam J. Hirsch, American History of Inheritance Law, in 3 OXFORD INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL HISTORY 239 (Stanley N. Katz ed. 2009). 
15. Frances H. Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance: A New Model from China, 1999 WIS. L. 
REV. 1199, 1217–18 (1999). 
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commentators have noted, “even a wealthy parent is permitted to leave his 
needy children penniless”16 and instead devise the entire estate to 
“collateral relatives, friends, or charity.”17 Very few countries permit 
testamentary freedom to extend this far—a fact Ralph Brashier noted 
twenty-five years ago: “Perhaps more than any other civilized people, 
Americans cling to and zealously guard this freedom, even while other 
common law countries have increasingly recognized a posthumous 
obligation to support needy family members.”18 Today, most civilized 
countries—even England, from which American succession laws are 
derived—have safeguards in place to protect children from 
disinheritance,19 making the United Sates “almost alone in the 
modern  world.”20 
That the United States would take such an approach is somewhat 
surprising given its general insistence that parents protect and provide for 
their children.21 For example, whereas every state requires parents to 
support their children during the child’s minority,22 succession laws 
permit a parent to disinherit a child of any age. Additionally, although 
states require parents to support adult children who remain dependent due 
to a disability,23 a parent can execute a will ensuring that any such 
obligation terminates with the parent’s death, effectively shifting the 
financial responsibility to the state.24 Finally, as the case that began this 
Article suggests, even children who were abused by a parent and, as a 
result suffer physical; psychological; and financial harm,25 can still be 
disinherited despite the states’ interest in protecting abused children.26 
                                                   
16. Ralph C. Brashier, Protecting the Child from Disinheritance: Must Louisiana Stand Alone, 57 
LA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1996) [hereinafter Brashier, Protecting the Child]. 
17. Ascher, supra note 12, at 80. 
18. Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 83, 172 
(1994) [hereinafter Brashier, Modern Family]. 
19. See infra section I.B. 
20. Ronald Chester, Disinheritance and the American Child: An Alternative from British Columbia, 
1998 UTAH L. REV. 1, 24 (1998). 
21. See, e.g., L.M. v. R.L.R., 888 N.E.2d 934, 937 (Mass. 2008) (noting that “[t]he law has long 
imposed a duty on parents to support, provide for and protect the children they bring forth”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); Tom Stacy, Acts, Omissions, and the Necessity of Killing Innocents, 29 
AM. J. CRIM. L. 481, 495 (2002) (“The parent/child relationship is the paradigmatic special 
relationship, imposing duties on parents to take action to protect their child’s basic welfare.”). 
22. See Jacqueline Asadorian, Disinheritance of Minor Children: A Proposal to Amend the 
Uniform Probate Code, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 101, 103 (2011). 
23. See infra note 286 and accompanying text. 
24. See Asadorian, supra note 22, at 103 (“[W]hen a parent is unwilling or unable to provide for a 
child, the state must step in and provide support.”). 
25. See infra notes 300–305 and accompanying text. 
26. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 853 (1990) (noting the “[s]tate’s interest in the physical 
and psychological well–being of child abuse victims”).  
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Thus, as Deborah Batts summarizes, “the parental obligation to nurture, 
support, educate, and provide for the child . . . . is consistently abandoned 
whenever it clashes with another fundamental concept imbedded in 
America’s social and legal structure: testamentary freedom.”27 
Despite that longstanding approach, it is the basic contention of this 
Article that reform has become increasingly necessary. First, with the 
increased incidences of divorce, marriage, and cohabitation,28 American 
children today are much more susceptible to parental disinheritance.29 As 
other scholars have noted, the children most likely to be disinherited are 
those “whose parents are divorced, those born out of wedlock, and 
particularly those children with a non-custodial parent who ha[ve] started 
a new family.”30 More importantly, reform is necessary because 
disinheritance can be extremely devastating to particular classes of 
children. Thus, as more parents fail to provide for their children at death, 
some of the states’ most vulnerable citizens are now at an even greater 
risk of harm at the hands of their parents. For those reasons, the time has 
come for the law to reconsider the expansive freedom it has extended to 
parent testators to disinherit their children. 
Although other legal scholars have criticized the American tolerance 
for child disinheritance, the solutions they have put forth have largely 
involved adopting some combination of the two approaches currently 
employed by the countries that do protect children from disinheritance: 
forced heirship and family maintenance statutes.31 It is the position of this 
Article, however, that the answer lies, not in the law of succession, but in 
the law of domestic relations—specifically, the doctrine of parens patriae. 
This doctrine confers upon courts both the power and the duty to protect 
children from abuse or neglect: “Parens patriae, literally ‘parent of the 
country,’ is the government’s power and responsibility, beyond its police 
                                                   
27. Batts, supra note 1, at 1197. 
28. See Michael J. Higdon, Constitutional Parenthood, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1483, 1487 (discussing 
how “issues of parenthood have . . . become more complicated through the rise in both divorce and 
nonmarital cohabitation”); infra notes 256–263 and accompanying text.  
29. See Brashier, Protecting the Child, supra note 16, at 11 (“Children of divorce and nonmarital 
children are particularly likely to bear the brunt of disinheritance.”). 
30. See Asadorian, supra note 22, at 121. 
31. See, e.g., Asadorian, supra note 22 (advocating for a forced heirship approach); Paul G. 
Haskell, The Power of Inheritance, 52 GEO. L.J. 499, 519 (same); Brashier, Protecting the Child, 
supra note 16, at 24 (suggesting an “intermediate system” that borrows from both the forced heirship 
and the family maintenance approaches); Chester, supra note 20 (advocating for a family maintenance 
approach similar to the one used in British Columbia); Foster, supra note 15 at 1207 (pointing to 
China’s forced heirship model in order to “highlight[] the inequities of the American system on an 
individual level and the need for a more flexible, responsive approach to inheritance”); Phyllis C. 
Taite, Freedom of Disposition v. Duty of Support: What’s a Child Worth?, 2019 WISC. L. REV. 325 
(advocating for a forced share for minor children and an elective share for adult children). For more 
on the two systems, see infra section I.B. 
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power over all citizens, to protect, care for, and control citizens who 
cannot take care of themselves.”32 And pursuant to this doctrine, the 
government’s power vis-à-vis parents is considerable. Lewis Hochheimer 
in his famous treatise on children described the relationship as follows: 
“[A]ll power and authority over infants are a mere delegated function 
entrusted by the sovereign state to the individual parent or guardian, 
revocable by the state through its tribunals, and to be at all times exercised 
in subordination to the paramount and overruling direction of the state.”33 
Looking at the problem of child disinheritance through the lens of 
parens patriae, this Article argues that, just as parents’ rights to direct the 
upbringing of their children must sometimes yield to the states’ overriding 
interest in protecting children, so too are there instances of attempted child 
disinheritance where testamentary freedom must likewise give way to 
those same interests. Namely, when confronted with situations in which a 
testator’s attempted disinheritance would subject a child to conditions 
amounting to abuse or neglect, the state must intervene in its role as 
“protector of vulnerable parties”34 and, absent evidence that the parent has 
sufficiently provided for the child in some other way, refuse to enforce 
the testator’s wishes. 
Given the high regard American law has for testamentary freedom, this 
proposal may initially appear unattainable or perhaps even unwise. 
However, utilizing parens patriae to curb testamentary freedom in the 
limited circumstances where disinheritance would amount to child abuse 
or neglect is instead consistent with the overall approach to American 
succession law. After all, testamentary freedom is not absolute. Two key 
limitations are relevant here. First, the law already refuses to enforce 
testamentary provisions that violate public policy.35 Examples include 
provisions that encourage illegal activity, are premised on racial 
restrictions, or promote divorce or separation.36 To accept this Article’s 
                                                   
32. Natalie L. Clark, Parens Patriae and A Modest Proposal for the Twenty-First Century: Legal 
Philosophy and A New Look at Children’s Welfare, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 381, 382 (2000). 
33. LEWIS HOCHHEIMER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATING TO THE CUSTODY OF INFANTS 16–
17 (1887); see also Kay P. Kindred, God Bless the Child: Poor Children, Parens Patriae, and a State 
Obligation to Provide Assistance, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 519, 521 (1996) (“Despite the weight imparted in 
both law and social policy to the parent-child relationship and to the values of family privacy, the 
state, in the proper exercise of its power as parens patriae, can require parents to provide proper food, 
clothing, shelter and medical care to their children.”). 
34. Brian H. Bix, Private Ordering and Family Law, 23 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 249, 260 (2010). 
35. See Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications, 
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1162 (2013) (“[A] court may refrain from enforcing a devise on the basis 
of public policy if the devise entails a significant externality.”). 
36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. c 
(AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“Among the rules of law that prohibit or restrict freedom of disposition in 
certain instances are those relating to spousal rights; creditors’ rights; unreasonable restraints on 
alienation or marriage; provisions promoting separation or divorce; impermissible racial or other 
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proposal, then, the law need only recognize parens patriae as a necessary 
addition to that list—one that is not difficult to defend given the state’s 
strong interest in protecting children.37 
Second, testamentary freedom is already curtailed by exceptions 
designed to protect similarly situated classes of individuals, most notably 
spouses and creditors.38 Spouses enjoy nearly universal protection from 
disinheritance in the various states either through an elective share or 
community property laws.39 The fact that spouses, but not children, are 
afforded such protection is somewhat ironic given that, unlike spouses, 
children did not join the family by choice and, at least in the case of minor 
children, have little ability to protect themselves financially.40 Even 
creditors occupy a better position than children by virtue of the fact that 
creditors—likely as a result of their greater political influence41—are 
permitted to make claims against a decedent’s estate.42 As one scholar 
noted, perhaps children would gain protection from disinheritance if “we 
thought of them as creditors rather than as loved ones.”43 Regardless of 
how the law classifies children’s interests, the more salient point is that 
protecting children from disinheritance does not require the law of 
succession to craft any new frameworks that are not already in place—the 
law need only recognize the wisdom and necessity of including children 
within them. 
This Article does not, however, go so far as to propose an absolute 
prohibition on child disinheritance. Although that is the approach taken 
by a number of countries, such an approach would curtail testamentary 
freedom too sharply and, as an initial matter, would likely fail to garner 
                                                   
categoric restrictions; provisions encouraging illegal activity; and the rules against perpetuities and 
accumulations. The foregoing list is illustrative, not exhaustive.”). 
37. See infra section II.B. 
38. See infra notes 324–335 and accompanying text. 
39. See Tate, supra note 8, at 160 (describing how states protect spouses “either through a statutory 
‘elective share’ of the testator’s property or by classifying both spouse’s earnings as community 
property, one-half of which belongs automatically to the surviving spouse”); Taite, supra note 31, at 
340–41 (explaining how, in a community property system, “[a]t the decedent spouse’s death, he can 
only devise his half of the community property” and thus “[t]he surviving spouse owns her own one 
half interest of the community estate so there is no need for a minimum share of the decedent’s 
spouse’s estate”). 
40. Brashier, Modern Family, supra note 18, at 182 (“The difference in protection afforded spouses 
and minor children is particularly ironic when one compares their positions. Spouses have the 
opportunity and ability to protect themselves from disinheritance; minor children do not.”). 
41. See Brashier, Protecting the Child, supra note 16, at 22 (noting that minor children “do not 
have the political power to ensure their protection from disinheritance”).  
42. See infra notes 333–334 and accompanying text.  
43. Haskell, supra note 31, at 508. 
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the support needed to become law in the United States.44 More 
importantly, there are compelling justifications that militate in favor of 
preserving the rights of testators to, in many instances, disinherit their 
children.45 Any proposal that ignored those policies could ultimately harm 
children even more. As one commentator explains, “[i]f donors believe 
courts may not facilitate their intent, donors may be less happy, 
accumulate less property, and alter gifts during life [and, as a result,] may 
harm not only the donors but also donees as a class.”46 
Thus, although this Article puts forth a proposal that would limit the 
testamentary freedom of a parent to disinherit the testator’s children, there 
are two important limitations. First, the only children who can avail 
themselves to this exception are those children most in need of the state’s 
protection—a category this Article refers to as “vulnerable child heirs.” 
Included within that subset of children are minor children, disabled adult 
children whose disabilities are such that they remain dependent upon their 
parents, and adult children who were abused at the hands of the testator 
parent during their minority. Second, even when a testator’s child falls 
into one of these three categories, the testator’s attempt at disinheritance 
will still be enforced so long as the disinheritance does not amount to 
abuse or neglect, meaning that, in the context of dependent children, the 
parent testator has in some other way sufficiently provided for the child 
and, in the context of adult survivors of child abuse, the disinheritance is 
unrelated to the abuse suffered during the child’s minority. These 
limitations, which are discussed in greater detail below,47 seek to keep any 
infringement of testamentary freedom to a minimum while, at the same 
time, permitting states to fulfill their parens patriae duty to protect those 
children who cannot protect themselves. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explores the law of child 
disinheritance, detailing and contrasting the permissive American 
approach with the more restrictive systems employed by other countries. 
Part II turns to parens patriae, exploring both the evolution of the doctrine 
and how it presently operates within the law of domestic relations. Part III 
details why—in light of the evolving family—the American approach to 
child disinheritance must change, what it is about the vulnerable child 
heirs that makes them particularly susceptible to the harms of 
disinheritance, and why the doctrine of parens patriae provides the most 
appropriate remedy for protecting them from harm. Finally, Part IV puts 
                                                   
44. See Chester, supra note 20, at 20 (“America’s resistance to protecting children via inheritance 
is rooted in its extreme individualism: the right of disinheritance stems from the protection of 
individual free will.”). 
45. See infra notes 100–110 and accompanying text. 
46. Kelly, supra note 35, at 1125. 
47. See infra section IV.A. 
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forth a proposal for implementing a parens patriae exception to a parent’s 
ability to disinherit their children, focusing on how the proposal would 
operate vis-á-vis the three categories of vulnerable child heirs and offering 
responses to some of the potential objections such an approach 
might  engender. 
I. DISINHERITANCE AND THE DEAD HAND 
The dead cannot own property—that much is clear. What is not so clear 
is the extent to which testators can exert “dead hand control” over the 
distribution of property that once belonged to them.48 At the heart of the 
question lies the tension between testamentary freedom and the testator’s 
moral duty to support the surviving spouse and children.49 Although far 
from being a zero-sum game, “the allocation of rights to the dead 
invariably affects the resources available to the living.”50 In the United 
States, that debate has largely been settled in favor of the dead hand. As 
Mark Ascher describes, “[t]he law of wills allows the dead virtually 
unfettered discretion in divvying up that which used to belong to them, 
and probate law generally requires the living to effectuate those desires.”51 
American law has done so out of its commitment to testamentary 
freedom, frequently referring to it as “[t]he organizing principle of the 
American law of succession.”52 Indeed, both legislatures and courts alike 
are extremely reluctant to take steps that might limit this time-honored 
freedom—a freedom Melanie Leslie describes as the belief that “[o]ne has 
a right to distribute property upon death solely according to the dictates 
of one’s own desires, unfettered by the constraints of society’s moral code 
or the claims of others.”53 In many ways, then, testamentary freedom is 
seen merely as “a logical extension of an owner’s freedom to deal with 
his property during his lifetime”54 and thus, “[j]ust as the man who 
                                                   
48. See Batts, supra note 1, at 1219 (noting how the “post mortem disposition of the 
property . . . . has always been a relative term; the testator has never enjoyed absolute freedom of 
testation”).  
49. See Brashier, Modern Family, supra note 18, at 132 (discussing the tension between “balancing 
testamentary freedom with moral obligation to protect and provide for one’s spouse and children”). 
50. RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN DEAD 
6 (2010); see also Batts, supra note 1, at 1217 (“There also is the two-sided coin aspect of inheritance: 
the ‘heads’ side being the right of the decedent to control disposition of the estate, and the ‘tails’ side 
being the right of the heir to receive the inheritance.”). 
51. Mark L. Ascher, But I Thought the Earth Belonged to the Living, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1149, 1149 (2011). 
52. Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of Disposition, 58 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 643, 643 (2014). 
53. Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 235 (1996). 
54. Batts, supra note 1, at 1219 (citations omitted). 
 
06 Higdon.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/20  11:46 PM 
628 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:619 
 
produced wealth has the right to use it in his lifetime, so he has the right 
to choose who shall be its recipient after death.”55 
Another rationale for allowing testamentary freedom to play such a 
central role in the law of inheritance include the belief that it increases 
donor satisfaction,56 thus allowing testators to have peace of mind that 
“even after death, those whom one cares about can be provided for.”57 
Testamentary freedom is also thought to promote not only capital 
accumulation,58 but also “industry and thrift”59 given that individuals are 
likely to work harder and save more if they believe they can direct the 
distribution of those assets after their death.60 A third justification comes 
from the fact that testators, as compared to legislatures and courts, likely 
“possess better information about the circumstances of family members 
and other donees,”61 thus enabling them to make better decisions 
regarding how their property should be distributed. Finally, there is the 
belief that testamentary freedom may actually strengthen families by 
“provid[ing] parents with greater control over their children and 
encourag[ing] children to care for their parents.”62 As one commentator 
explained, “the only way to induce children to perform and not to shirk 
responsibility while waiting for an inheritance is to allow their parents the 
possibility of disinheriting them.”63 In light of these rationales, American 
law has come to regard testamentary freedom “not only as a natural almost 
political right, but a natural condition of all law as well.”64 
                                                   
55. Daniel J. Kornstein, Inheritance: A Constitutional Right?, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 741, 752 (1984) 
(citations omitted); see also STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 65 
(2004) (“[B]equeathing property is simply one way of using property.”). 
56. See Kelly, supra note 35, at 1135. 
57. Edward C. Halbach, Jr., An Introduction to Chapters 1–4, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY 
PROPERTY 3, 5 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed. 1977). 
58. See Kelly, supra note 35, at 1136 (“[T]estamentary freedom promotes capital accumulation.”); 
Tate, supra note 8, at 158 (“[W]hile people primarily accumulate wealth to guard against future 
contingencies during life, the desire to bequeath wealth to future generations does play a secondary 
role.”).  
59. Halbach, supra note 57, at 4. 
60. See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 
IND. L.J. 1, 45 (1992) (“Confident that government will fly to the rescue of those in need, citizens of 
a welfare state may thus be tempted to work fewer hours, to save less of their earnings, and to take 
greater gambles with their financial resources or careers (human capital) than is socially desirable.”). 
61. Kelly, supra note 35, at 1136. 
62. Id. at 1137; see also Hirsch & Wang, supra note 60, at 10 (“The testator’s power to bequeath 
encourages her beneficiaries to provide her with care and comfort—services that add to the total 
economic ‘pie.’”).  
63. Pierre Pestieau, Gifts, Wills and Inheritance Law, in 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 96, 109 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest Eds., 2011). 
64. Saul Touster, Testamentary Freedom and Social Control—After-Born Children—Part I: The 
New York Experience, 6 BUFF. L. REV. 251, 255 (1957). 
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Nonetheless, a number of scholars have argued that this 
characterization of testamentary freedom is, at least in some respects, 
mere “lip service.”65 There are, after all, a number of instances where the 
law has forced the dead hand of the testator “to relax its grip.”66 Indeed, 
“the dead hand rules succession only by sufferance”67 and thus legally 
sanctioned postmortem control is forever at the mercy of the living. Just 
as there are limits on how property owners may use their property while 
alive, there are likewise a number of restrictions on how the deceased may 
direct the use of their former property.68 Stated generally, testamentary 
wishes must yield whenever “the donor attempts to make a disposition or 
achieve a purpose that is prohibited or restricted by an overriding rule 
of  law.”69 
Consider, for instance, a Supreme Court’s ruling from 1827 that “a 
testator cannot, by his will, withdraw from his creditors any property 
which the law subjects to their claims.”70 To this day, the law continues 
to protect decedents’ creditors,71 and notably “[t]he cry of invasion of 
property rights is seldom heard in this connection.”72 The same could be 
said of estate tax given that, despite representing “a direct restraint upon 
donative disposition,”73 such tax still must be paid. The Uniform Probate 
Code (UPC) imposes additional restrictions, invalidating testamentary 
schemes that embody “unreasonable restraints on alienation or marriage; 
provisions promoting separation or divorce; impermissible racial or other 
categoric restrictions; [and] provisions encouraging illegal activity.”74 
                                                   
65. Leslie, supra note 53, at 273. 
66. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, AND 
INHERITANCE LAW 125 (2009). 
67. Kelly, supra note 35, at 1166 (citations omitted); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 66, at 182 
(“The brutal fact remains: the dead are definitely dead. The dead ‘control’ beyond the grave only 
insofar as living people let them do so.”). 
68. See Batts, supra note 1, at 1220 (“Society does not hesitate to restrict the uses to which a 
property owner, while alive, may put his property when it is unreasonably harmful to others, when he 
has obligations of family support, or when he is indebted to others.”). 
69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. c 
(AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
70. Potter v. Gardner, 25 U.S. 498, 501 (1827). 
71. See Kelly, supra note 35, at 1163 (discussing how the Uniform Probate Code safeguards the 
rights of decedents’’ creditors); see also infra notes 333–335 and accompanying text. 
72. Haskell, supra note 31, at 509. 
73. Id. at 510; see also David Horton, Testation and Speech, 101 GEO. L.J. 61, 99 n. 291 (2012) 
(“For instance, a plaintiff who challenges the federal estate tax or the rule against perpetuities on First 
Amendment grounds would not be able to prove that either principle calls the genuineness of her 
testamentary wishes into question. Indeed, these doctrines acknowledge the testator’s or settlor’s 
intent but simply refuse to carry it out.”). 
74. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. 
c (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
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When it comes to the family, however, perhaps the biggest limitation 
on testamentary freedom involves spouses. As Ralph Brashier has noted, 
“[c]ommitment to testamentary freedom . . . has not prevented most state 
legislatures from enacting substantial statutory protection for disinherited 
spouses.”75 Indeed, in every state but one, the surviving spouse is the only 
member of the family who cannot be completely excluded from receiving 
a portion of the testator’s property.76 States provide this protection either 
through an “elective share” (i.e., a percentage of the decedent’s estate that 
the surviving spouse can elect to take in lieu of what—if anything—was 
provided by the testator77) or through the protections that flow from 
community property laws, which automatically classify one-half of the 
testator’s property as belonging to the spouse.78 Although there is some 
debate about just how meaningful these protections are,79 they nonetheless 
exist to try and “ensure that the rare spouse who is disinherited may claim 
a part of the testator’s estate.”80 
Testators’ children enjoy no such protection. In every state but 
Louisiana, a “testator is free to disinherit even needy, minor children, 
regardless of the size of the estate.”81 It is hardly surprising, then, that 
children are the family members most often impacted by disinheritance.82 
As a number of scholars have noted, the changing American family has 
only exacerbated this problem, with the result that children today are more 
likely than ever before to be disinherited.83 However, before discussing 
the increasing need for legal protections against disinheritance, it is first 
necessary to understand how the United States came to adopt its approach 
to child disinheritance, how those laws currently operate in the United 
                                                   
75. Brashier, Modern Family, supra note 18, at 85. 
76. Tate, supra note 8, at 160 (“With the exception of Georgia, every American state limits the 
ability of a testator to disinherit a surviving spouse.”). 
77. See Naomi R. Cahn, Parenthood, Genes, and Gametes: The Family Law and Trusts and Estates 
Perspectives, 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 563, 601 (2002) (“Within trusts and estates law, the freedom to 
will one’s property is subject to a spousal elective share, which entitles a surviving spouse to take 
property regardless of what a will provides.”). 
78. See Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571, 612 n.137 (1997) 
(“The community property system limits the problem of spousal disinheritance since each spouse 
automatically owns a half-interest in all property acquired during the marriage.”). 
79. See Foster, supra note 15, at 1218–19 (noting how “[o]mitted spouse and marital property rights 
provisions award property on the basis of fixed rules and disregard the survivor’s actual needs and 
circumstances”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
80. Brashier, Protecting the Child, supra note 16, at 13. 
81. Brashier, Modern Family, supra note 18, at 84–85 (emphasis omitted). 
82. See Chester, supra note 20, at 4 (“Accordingly, it is not surprising that those family members 
aggrieved by disinheritance are overwhelmingly children. In fact, a recent study . . . found that 71.3% 
of will contests involved either stepchildren or children, and that only 13.2% of will contests involved 
first or second spouses.”). 
83. See Brashier, Modern Family, supra note 18, at 165 (stating that America’s children “now more 
than ever appear likely to be disinherited”). 
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States, and why it is that “[t]he American parent’s ability to disinherit his 
children is unimaginable to most people of the world.”84 
A. The United States Approach 
Throughout the United States—with the notable exception of 
Louisiana85—“[t]he intentional disinheritance of a child by a competent 
testator is both permissible and unchallengeable.”86 In fact, with what has 
been described as the “American indifference to the disinheritance of 
children,”87 a testator is free to go so far as to “pauperize his helpless 
dependents.”88 Like many legal doctrines within the United States, the 
freedom to disinherit children was imported from England. English law 
had at one point actually protected children from disinheritance,89 but 
“[b]y the time of the American Revolution, an English testator could 
indeed exclude his children when bequeathing his chattels.”90 Although 
American independence would result in the repudiation of a number of 
British legal concepts, child disinheritance was not one of them. In fact, 
the United States would continue to adhere to this approach even after 
England eventually abandoned it,91 resulting in a system today that 
“defer[s] even more to the Dead Hand than the English.”92 
To illustrate, consider a 1995 Pennsylvania case in which the father 
died, leaving behind three minor children.93 Despite the fact that the father 
was the custodial parent, he left no part of his estate to his children.94 He 
instead devised everything to his second wife who, following his death, 
refused to care for the three children.95 The children’s mother, who was 
the testator’s first wife, subsequently brought suit, claiming that the 
decedent’s estate was liable for child support.96 The lower court dismissed 
her complaint, and the appellate court affirmed, merely noting—in an 
                                                   
84. RALPH C. BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW AND THE EVOLVING FAMILY 91 (2004) [hereinafter 
BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW]. 
85. See infra notes 147–153 and accompanying text. 
86. Brashier, Modern Family, supra note 18, at 169. 
87. Batts, supra note 1, at 1198. 
88. Foster, supra note 15, at 1217 (quotations omitted). 
89. See Tate, supra note 8, at 149–54 (discussing how dissatisfaction with primogeniture lead to a 
change in the law whereby testators were given greater freedom vis-á-vis their children). 
90. Brashier, Protecting the Child, supra note 16, at 17. 
91. See infra notes 130–131. 
92. Ascher, supra note 51, at 1171.  
93. Garney v. Estate of Hain, 653 A.2d 21 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). 
94. Id. at 22 (Sole, J., dissenting) (“Appellant’s three children resided with the deceased and his 
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opinion that spanned less than a single page—that “[t]he decedent 
disposed of his property as he wished prior to his death and . . . absent 
legislative authority to do so, we decline to rewrite the decedent’s will.”97 
In support, the court cited an earlier case in which it had held that a 
“testator with children may disinherit one or all [given that] a testator is 
free to dispose of property as he sees fit.”98 
Considering that one of the primary obligations parents have during life 
is to support their children, the fact that a parent’s death can so easily 
terminate this obligation—but not others, such as debts owed to 
creditors—can appear somewhat inconsistent.99 To justify this disparity, 
a number of possible rationales have been put forth. One of the primary 
justifications for child disinheritance is that it is more efficient if the estate 
instead passes to the surviving spouse, who in turn will use a portion to 
benefit the children.100 Referred to as a “trickle down” or “conduit 
effect,”101 the theory is that “the testator’s minor children—who are also 
the children of the surviving spouse—receive indirect protection from 
disinheritance because of the survivor’s continued legal obligation to 
support those children.”102 As discussed more fully below, however, there 
is some debate about the extent to which the law can continue to rely on 
that theory in light of the greater instances of divorce, cohabitation, and 
remarriage.103 Additionally, some argue that protections against 
disinheritance are unnecessary given that “[m]ost parents sense their 
moral obligations to their children and seek to fulfill those obligations to 
                                                   
97. Id. at 22. 
98. Id. (quoting In re Agostini’s Estate, 457 A.2d 861 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983)). 
99. Paul G. Haskell, Restraints Upon the Disinheritance of Family Members, in DEATH, TAXES 
AND FAMILY PROPERTY, supra note 57, at 105, 114 (“The moral obligation during life to support 
one’s spouse and minor children was made law, but no comparable legal duty was imposed with 
respect to transmission of property to children, minor or of age. . . .”). 
100. See E. Gary Spitko, The Expressive Function of Succession Law and the Merits of Non-Marital 
Inclusion, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 1063, 1078 (1999) (“The conduit theory is premised on the notion that a 
typical decedent with surviving children would view the surviving spouse as both a primary 
beneficiary—someone who can better manage the property if the surviving children are minors, and 
is more in need of the property to ensure a secure retirement if the surviving children are adults—and 
as a conduit—someone who will, in time, pass the property on to the surviving children when the 
surviving spouse die.”). 
101. See Brian C. Brennan, Disinheritance of Dependent Children: Why Isn’t America Fulfilling 
Its Moral Obligation?, 14 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 125, 131 (1999). 
102. Brashier, Protecting the Child, supra note 16, at 13–14; see also Judith G. McMullen, Father 
(or Mother) Knows Best: An Argument Against Including Post-Majority Educational Expenses in 
Court-Ordered Child Support, 34 IND. L. REV. 343, 355 (2001) (“There is an expectation that the 
surviving parent will continue to provide for the children, and indeed is legally obligated to do so if 
the children are minors.”); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of 
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 995 (1979) (“A decedent cannot, however, disinherit 
his spouse, and current law effectively entrusts the surviving parent with child-rearing responsibility 
in the light of existing economic resources.”). 
103. See infra notes 256–263 and accompanying text. 
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the best of their abilities.”104 Of course, as Paul Haskell has pointed out, 
“[t]his is undoubtedly true, but the same can be said for all kinds of 
aberrational conduct which the law prohibits or punishes.”105 
When it comes to disinheriting adult children, other justifications come 
into play. First, the threat of disinheritance can extract greater caregiving 
from the testator’s children.106 Second, the parent may be operating under 
an “altruistic belief that total disinheritance of one’s child forces that child 
to become a more fully self-actualized individual and contributing 
member of society.”107 The concern being that children may have less 
incentive to achieve their full potential if they are guaranteed an 
inheritance.108 As one commentator has noted, however, such arguments 
may have less force in our modern world where life expectancies have 
increased so dramatically: 
Perhaps in an age when physical danger, rampant disease, 
frequent wars, plagues, natural disasters, and myriad other life-
threatening and shortening factors severely curtailed adult life 
expectancies, the fear of children “waiting around” to inherit, 
rather than getting on with their own lives, may have had some 
currency. In our present era of miracle drugs, life-saving surgery 
and technology, health and fitness consciousness, and better diet, 
all resulting in increased longevity, it is not likely that sixty-year-
old “children” are holding their lives in abeyance, waiting for 
eighty-five and ninety-year-old-parents to finally die and leave 
them an inheritance.109 
Somewhat relatedly, a final justification is that a testator may simply 
regard an aging spouse as more in need of the estate than adult children, 
who are likely younger and more able-bodied.110 
                                                   
104. Brashier, Protecting the Child, supra note 16, at 7.  
105. See Haskell, supra note 99, at 114. 
106. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text; see also Tate, supra note 8, at 134 (“Once a 
punishment inflicted primarily on wayward progeny, disinheritance of adult, non-disabled 
descendants has become an unfortunate but necessary consequence of the need to reward those who 
care for their aging parents or grandparents.”). 
107. Brashier, Protecting the Child, supra note 16, at 7. 
108. Asadorian, supra note 22, at 110–11 (noting that a criticism of forced inheritance is that it 
“might cause heirs to become lazy and unmotivated because they know they will ultimately inherit 
from their parents.”); see also Brennan, supra note 101, at 129 n.20 (“‘the very knowledge of the 
certainty of the inheritance to come’ may often deprive children ‘of any motive to lead a useful life.’”) 
(quoting ALEX SHOUMATOFF, THE MOUNTAIN OF NAMES 103–05 (1985)). 
109. Batts, supra note 1, at 1221. 
110. See Asadorian, supra note 22, at 107 (“In the case of an older testator with adult children, the 
decedent may feel that the surviving spouse has a greater need for financial support.”); see also 
Brashier, Protecting the Child, supra note 16, at 8 (“With life expectancies and costs of elder care 
increasing, the testator spouse may feel that most, if not all, of his estate should be devised to the 
surviving spouse.”).  
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Despite these justifications for permitting child disinheritance, other 
areas of American succession law do attempt to protect children from the 
financial harms that can result from losing a parent. Chief among them 
are laws regarding intestate succession, which provide default rules for 
distributing the property of those who die without a will.111 In contrast to 
children whose parents die testate, children whose parents die intestate are 
virtually guaranteed a portion of their parents’ estates.112 As Lee-ford Tritt 
explains, “[t]he most dominant goal of normative defaults is protecting 
the family.”113 Thus, it comes as little surprise then that “[e]very state 
intestacy statute provides that, if a decedent leaves ‘issue,’ the issue will 
receive a portion of the decedent’s estate.”114 Under California’s intestacy 
law, for instance, children receive half of the estate.115 
Even in the contexts of wills, there do exist some—albeit modest—
protections for children. First, a number of states have enacted 
pretermitted child statutes, which are designed to protect children from 
unintentional disinheritance.116 They operate by awarding children an 
intestate share in situations where either the child was born after the 
execution of the will or the child was born prior to the will but was not 
specifically referenced in the testamentary document.117 But, as Lawrence 
Friedman has noted, such protections are largely illusory: “The most, 
then, that can be said is that in some states it takes a slight effort to 
disinherit a child, but a parent who really wants to leave nothing to his 
children can do it fairly easily.”118 Finally, there may be limited 
                                                   
111. ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 63 (10th ed. 2017) 
(“Distribution of the probate property of [people who die without a will] is governed by the default 
rules of the law of intestacy.” (emphasis in original)). 
112. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-103(a) (2018) (“Any part of the intestate estate not passing 
to a decedent’s surviving spouse . . . or the entire intestate estate if there is no surviving spouse, passes 
in the following order to the individuals who survive the decedent: (1) to the decedent’s descendants 
by representation.”). 
113. Lee-ford Tritt, Technical Correction or Tectonic Shift: Competing Default Rule Theories 
Under the New Uniform Probate Code, 61 ALA. L. REV. 273, 292 (2010). 
114. Susan C. Stevenson-Popp, «I Have Loved You in My Dreams»: Posthumous Reproduction 
and the Need for Change in the Uniform Parentage Act, 52 CATH. U. L. REV. 727, 733 (2003). As 
used in this context, “issue” refers not only to the decedent’s children, but all lineal descendants. See 
Richard C. Ausness, Planned Parenthood: Adult Adoption and the Right of Adoptees to Inherit, 41 
ACTEC L.J. 241, 285 (2015) (“The terms ‘descendants,’ ‘lineal descendants’ or ‘issue’ have the same 
meaning in legal parlance, namely a person’s lineal descendants by blood.”). 
115. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 6401, 6401 (2015). 
116. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Multiple-Marriage Society and Spousal Rights Under the 
Revised Uniform Probate Code, 76 IOWA L. REV. 223, 254 (1991). 
117. Katherine Shaw Spaht, et al., The New Forced Heirship Legislation: A Regrettable 
«Revolution», 50 LA. L. REV. 409, 479 (1990) (“About half of the states protect children who are alive 
when the will was written, not just children born after the will was written, by giving them the share 
they would have received in intestacy when they have not been mentioned in the will.”). 
118. FRIEDMAN, supra note 66, at 39. 
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protections for minor children whose testator parent was subject to a 
support decree given that, in some states, such orders survive the death of 
the parent.119 This protection, however, will only serve to benefit a small 
class of children—those who, during the testator’s life, received a court 
order of support that was still in effect at the time of the testator’s death. 
Beyond these specific protections, American judges are not above 
resorting to “covert manipulation of doctrine”120 in order to effectuate the 
normative—if not the legal—requirement that testators provide for the 
surviving members of their nuclear family.121 The doctrines in question 
typically include fraud, undue influence, and testamentary intent122— all 
of which were originally designed to protect against testamentary devices 
that do not reflect the testator’s free will.123 Nonetheless, as other scholars 
have noted, courts will sometimes stretch the limits of those doctrines in 
an attempt to effectuate a more “subjectively just distribution of a 
testator’s estate.”124 In one example, a court used undue influence to 
invalidate the will of a testator who disinherited her two adult sons in favor 
of the man with whom she had cohabitated for the past four years.125 As 
analyzed by Melanie Leslie in her (aptly-titled) article, The Myth of 
Testamentary Freedom, the court reached that conclusion despite the fact 
that “there were few of the traditional indicia of undue influence.”126 
Instead, the court seemed to focus more on two non-testamentary 
considerations: (1) “the illicit nature of the [nonmarital] relationship 
between testator and beneficiary” and (2) the court’s apparent view that 
the disinheritance was unjust in light of the fact that “the sons had gotten 
                                                   
119. Haskell, supra note 31, at 510 (“It is interesting to note that the one instance in which the law 
has recognized an obligation of the disinheriting parent’s estate to support a minor child is one in 
which there was a support decree in existence prior to the death of the parent; it seems that the minor 
child was considered to be a creditor of the decedent, and therefore entitled to satisfaction of the 
decedent’s obligation from the decedent’s estate.”). 
120. Leslie, supra note 53, at 236.  
121. Ray D. Madoff, supra note 78, at 611 (describing the belief “that unless the family has done 
something to ‘deserve’ disinheritance, the bulk of a person’s property should be left to his or her 
spouse and blood relatives”).  
122. See Ronald Chester, Should American Children Be Protected Against Disinheritance?, 32 
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 405, 426–27 (1997) (“It is well known that disinherited children in the 
United States may also resort to the flexible common-law concepts of undue influence, insane 
delusion, and lack of testamentary capacity to challenge their parents’ wills.”). 
123. See Mark Glover, The Timing of Testation, 107 KY. L.J. 221, 244 (2018) (“[F]raud, duress, 
and undue influence all involve a wrongdoer undermining the testator’s freedom of disposition, so 
that the estate plan described in a will reflects the wrongdoer’s intent rather than the testator’s 
intent.”). 
124. Leslie, supra note 53, at 289. 
125. See Gaines v. Frawley, 739 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987). 
126. Leslie, supra note 53, at 250. 
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along well with their mother and had been frequent visitors to 
her  home.”127 
Although the courts in these cases may be motivated by a desire to 
protect children from disinheritance, attempting to do so by inflating legal 
doctrines that were designed to guard against unrelated concerns is hardly 
an ideal remedy. As one scholar put it, such an approach is “indirect, 
haphazard, and finally unsatisfactory.”128 Not only were these doctrines 
never intended to combat “unseemly” testamentary schemes, but judges 
are inconsistent in even applying them in that manner, thus making it 
impossible for litigants to rely on any such protection. As a whole, when 
it comes to child disinheritance, the fact that the current legal protections 
that do exist in the United States are so few and so limited stand as “a 
salient indicator of the value America places on testamentary freedom.”129 
B. International Approaches 
Although England once permitted testators to freely disinherit their 
children,130 that would all change in the early twentieth century. With the 
Inheritance (Family Provision) Act of 1938, the “English testator’s right 
to disinherit his children . . . for any reason that pleased his fancy” came 
to an end.131 Even though this change occurred more than eighty years 
ago, it came about primarily because England recognized even then that 
“very few civilized countries still permitted [the disinheritance of] 
children.”132 Nearly forty years earlier, New Zealand had become the first 
common law country to terminate parents’ rights to indiscriminately 
disinherit their children.133 Such protections would eventually spread to 
other common law countries like Australia, Wales, and several of the 
Canadian Provinces.134 In so doing, these countries joined civil law 
                                                   
127. Id. at 251–52. According to Leslie, “[t]he court briefly wrestled with the question of whether 
the testator and the beneficiary had had a common-law marriage, noting that ‘the formal relationship 
between testatrix and appellant is relevant to the issue of whether or not the disposition was natural.’” 
Id. at 251 (quoting Gaines, 739 S.W.2d at 951–52). 
128. Chester, supra note 20, at 28.  
129. Asadorian, supra note 22, at 106.  
130. And that was the approach that existed at the time they established the American colonies. See 
supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text.  
131. Dainow, Limitations on Testamentary Freedom in England, 3 CORNELL L. Q. 337, 337 (1940) 
(“In July, 1939, there came to an end an epoch of over five centuries’ duration.”). 
132. Brashier, Modern Family, supra note 18, at 122. 
133. Terry L. Turnipseed, Why Shouldn’t I Be Allowed to Leave My Property to Whomever I 
Choose at My Death?, 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 737, 753 (2006) (“At the start of the twentieth century, New 
Zealand became the first common-law jurisdiction to pass legislation providing for certain family 
members in the case of disinheritance.”). 
134. See Tate, supra note 8, at 140. 
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countries like France,135 where children had long enjoyed protections from 
disinheritance.136 Today, countries throughout the modern world have 
laws in place to safeguard the inheritance rights of children.137 
Conspicuously missing from this list is the United States. Thus, to 
understand the existing methods for protecting children from the harms of 
disinheritance, one must look to these other countries, which tend to 
employ one of two approaches: (1) forced share or forced heirship 
systems, in which children are automatically entitled to inherit a set 
percentage of the testator’s estate; and (2) family maintenance statutes, 
which permit the testator’s family and dependents to petition the court for 
a discretionary award of some portion of the estate. The remainder of this 
section offers a brief description of each. 
1. Forced Heirships 
Forced heirships exist in a variety of countries, including the 
Scandinavian countries,138 many of the civil law countries,139 and even 
China.140 Under this system, children are entitled to a certain percentage 
of their parents’ estate regardless of “the size of the estate, the age of the 
children, [or] the need of the children.”141 Those who qualify are referred 
to as “forced heirs” given that “the testator cannot deprive these heirs from 
inheriting a portion of the testator’s estate—the individuals are ‘forced’ to 
be heirs.”142 Thus, in countries that employ this approach, “a person who 
leaves surviving children never [has] complete freedom of testation, and 
unless the children merit a just disinherison they always obtain some part 
of the parent’s succession despite contrary disposition by will.”143 In terms 
of who qualifies as a forced heir and to what percentage that person is 
                                                   
135. See Taite, supra note 31, at 327 (“Civil law is primarily practiced in continental Europe 
(specifically Germany, France, and Spain), Russia, China, Japan, Latin America, and parts of 
Africa.”). 
136. See Turnipseed, supra note 133, at 753 (“In France, testamentary freedom became taboo after 
the revolution.”). 
137. Brashier, Protecting the Child, supra note 16, at 1 (“[P]rovisions protecting children from 
disinheritance are in place in most modern nations throughout the world.”).  
138. See Batts, supra note 1, at 1211 (noting that the Scandinavian countries follow the forced 
heirship model). 
139. See Jeffrey Schoenblum, Choice of Law and Succession to Wealth: A Critical Analysis of the 
Ramifications of the Hague Convention on Succession to Decedents’ Estates, 32 VA. J. INT’L L. 83, 
119 n.146 (1991) (“Forced heirship is the doctrine followed in many civil law systems.”). 
140. See Foster, supra note 15, at 1221 (“China has followed the lead of civil law and Scandinavian 
countries and adopted a forced share approach.”). 
141. See Batts, supra note 1, at 1226. 
142. Lee-ford Tritt, Liberating Estates Law from the Constraints of Copyright, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 
109, 113 n.10 (2006). 
143. Dainow, supra note 131, at 337. 
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entitled, countries take different approaches.144 In Brazil, for instance, 
spouses as well as children are considered forced heirs and possess “an 
indivisible right to at least 50 percent of the deceased’s estate.”145 In the 
Netherlands, however, only children qualify as forced heirs and each child 
is entitled to half of what he or she would have inherited had the parent 
died intestate.146 
The forced heirship model is not a complete stranger to the United 
States. Louisiana, as the lone state to protect the inheritance rights of 
children, does so by drawing upon its civil law traditions and employing 
a forced heirship approach, called the legitime.147 Even Louisiana, 
however, is not immune to the American desire to maximize testamentary 
freedom. As a result, Louisiana’s protections are much more modest than 
most of the countries that have implemented a forced heirship approach.148 
In 1921, Louisiana had made forced heirships part of the state 
constitution, providing that “[n]o law shall be passed abolishing forced 
heirship.”149 Eventually, however, Louisiana would amend its constitution 
to limit the class of forced heirs to only those children who are “twenty-
three years of age or younger . . . [or] who, because of mental incapacity 
or physical infirmity, are incapable of taking care of their persons or 
administering their estates.”150 Even children who fall into these 
categories, however, can be disinherited for “just cause,”151 including 
situations where the child has physically harmed the parent or falsely 
accused the parent of a serious crime.152 For the remaining children who 
                                                   
144. Ryan McLearen, International Forced Heirship: Concerns and Issues with European Forced 
Heirship Claims, 3 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 323, 341 (2011) (“Even though most civil law 
jurisdictions originated from the Napoleonic Code, today, European countries have an array of forced 
heir distribution structures as a result of years of cultural evolution.”). 
145. Elisabeth Libertuci, Brazil, in U.S. INTERNATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING *2 (2019), Westlaw 
USIEP WGL ¶ 6.04. 
146. Aaron Schwabach, Of Charities and Clawbacks: The European Union Proposal on 
Successions and Wills as a Threat to Charitable Giving, 17 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 447, 461 (2011). 
147. Tate, supra note 8, at 139 (“Although the testator has the freedom to bequeath a substantial 
part of the estate to persons of the testator’s choosing, the statute reserves a certain portion, called the 
legitime, for qualified children and other lineal descendants entitled to take by representation.”). 
148. See Taite, supra note 31, at 335 (“Among the forced share jurisdictions, Louisiana is a 
moderate version.”). 
149. LA. CONST. of 1921, art. IV, § 16. 
150. LA. CONST. art. 12, § 5. 
151. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1494 (2018). 
152. The full list contains eight different examples of “just cause”: 
(1) The child has raised his hand to strike a parent, or has actually struck a parent [ ]; (2) The child 
has been guilty, towards a parent, of cruel treatment, crime, or grievous injury; (3) The child has 
attempted to take the life of a parent; (4) The child, without reasonable basis, has accused a parent of 
committing a crime for which the law provides that the punishment could be life imprisonment or 
death; (5) The child has used any act of violence or coercion to hinder a parent from making a 
testament; (6) The child, being a minor, has married without the consent of the parent; (7) The child 
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can avail themselves to the legitime, they are entitled to one-half of the 
testator’s estate; one-fourth if there is only one forced heir.153 
Thus, to varying degrees, forced heirship jurisdictions offer children 
protection from disinheritance. An additional benefit of this approach is 
the certainty that comes from knowing, for any given testator, which 
family members can avail themselves of these protections and to what 
percentage they are entitled. With that certainty comes “procedural 
simplicity,”154 thus preventing judges from substituting their own 
discretion when determining exactly how to distribute a testator’s estate. 
At the same time, one of the problems with the forced heirship approach 
is that it is not particularly responsive to the needs of those children who 
seek its benefits.155 Thus, if a testator leaves behind more than one forced 
heir, both will take equal amounts regardless of their individual 
circumstances.156 Further, the amount the forced heir(s) can claim is 
limited to a certain percentage of the estate, which may or may not be 
sufficient to cover the child’s needs.157 Finally, because the forced 
heirship model infringes upon the testator’s freedom to disinherit children, 
it raises many of the concerns, noted earlier,158 that the American 
approach seeks to prevent—chief among them the concern that 
“guaranteed inheritance . . . might cause heirs to become lazy and 
unmotivated because they know they will ultimately inherit from 
their  parents.”159 
2. Family Maintenance Statutes 
Whereas civil law countries protect children from disinheritance using 
forced heirships, common law countries like England, Australia, and 
                                                   
has been convicted of a crime for which the law provides that the punishment could be life 
imprisonment or death; and (8) The child, after attaining the age of majority and knowing how to 
contact the parent, has failed to communicate with the parent without just cause for a period of two 
years, unless the child was on active duty in any of the military forces of the United States at the time. 
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1621(A) (2018). 
153. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1495 (2018). 
154. Asadorian, supra note 22, at 110. 
155. See Batts, supra note 1, at 1226 (noting that, under the forced heirship model, “[n]either the 
size of the estate, the age of the children, nor the need of the children is relevant”). 
156. See Foster, supra note 15, at 1213 (“Forced heirship’s scheme of arbitrary, ‘fickle fractions’ 
does not recognize let alone address differing individual needs among the decedent’s surviving 
dependents.”). 
157. See Haskell, supra note 31, at 518 (“[F]orced heirship goes a long way in the protection of the 
children and parents of the decedent. It does, however, have the disadvantage of not relating to the 
need of the surviving dependent.”). 
158. See supra notes 101–110 and accompanying text. 
159. Asadorian, supra note 31, at 110–11. 
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Canada160 rely upon family maintenance statutes, which authorize “a 
discretionary judicial process that can provide for the needs of a surviving 
child by overriding a parent’s will upon a showing of just cause.”161 In 
other words, these statutes allow certain parties—typically the testator’s 
immediate family and dependents—to petition for an award greater than 
what the testator directed.162 Thus, the family maintenance approach, in 
contrast to forced heirships, offers courts much more flexibility, 
“effectively permit[ing] a judge not only to alter the testamentary wishes 
of the decedent, but also to do so in a highly discretionary manner.”163 
The courts’ discretion, however, is not unlimited. The chief limitation 
entails the small class of people who have standing to petition the court 
for relief. Consider, for instance, the family maintenance statute from 
British Columbia: 
Notwithstanding any law or statute to the contrary, if a testator dies 
leaving a will which does not, in the court’s opinion, make adequate 
provision for the proper maintenance and support of the testator’s wife, 
husband or children, the court may, in its discretion, in an action by or on 
behalf of the wife, husband or children, order that the provision that it 
thinks adequate, just and equitable in the circumstances be made out of 
the estate of the testator for the wife, husband or children.164 
Beyond limiting those who have standing to petition for maintenance, 
most statutes also enumerate factors intended to guide courts as they 
adjudicate whether a disinherited child is entitled to relief.165 As Ray 
Madoff explains, the English law regarding family maintenance directs 
the courts to take into account a number of considerations including the 
“resources and needs that the applicant currently has and is likely to have 
in the foreseeable future; the size and nature of the decedent’s estate; any 
                                                   
160. See Jeffrey E. Stake, Biologically Biased Beneficence, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1101, 1116 (2016) 
(noting that “England, Australia, New Zealand, and some Canadian provinces” use family 
maintenance statutes). 
161. Brennan, supra note 101, at 125–26. 
162. See Leslie, supra note 53, at 237 (“Those statutes give courts extraordinarily broad discretion 
to ignore the provisions of a will and distribute testators’ estates to family or dependents on the ground 
that the testator has a moral obligation to provide for them.”); FRIEDMAN, supra note 66, at 43 (noting 
how England’s family maintenance statute gives judges the discretion “to allot money from an estate 
to wives and husbands, former wives or husbands who are single, children, and anybody else the 
deceased was supporting.”). 
163. Brashier, Modern Family, supra note 18, at 124–25. 
164. Wills Variation Act, R.S.B.C., c.435, § 2(1) (1979) (Can.) [https://perma.cc/988H-M3WH] 
(emphasis added). 
165. See Jennifer R. Boone Hargis, Solving Injustice in Inheritance Laws Through Judicial 
Discretion: Common Sense Solutions from Common Law Tradition, 2 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 
447, 458 (2003) (noting that, although the laws “differ significantly,” all contain at least some factors 
to guide the court).  
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physical or mental disabilities of the applicant; and . . . the conduct of 
the  applicant.”166 
Those scholars who advocate for the family maintenance approach do 
so on the basis that it not only protects children, but also preserves some 
degree of testamentary freedom.167 Unlike forced heirs who will almost 
certainly inherit a certain percentage of the parent’s estate,168 the family 
maintenance approach provides at least the possibility that the court could 
uphold the testator’s wishes. To the extent the family maintenance 
approach is at odds with testamentary freedom, supporters do 
acknowledge that fact but nonetheless characterize that interference as 
minimal and, in any event, justified by its ability to protect needy or 
deserving family members.169 
Nonetheless, the chief criticism of the family maintenance scheme is 
that it is imbued with uncertainty in several respects.170 First, from the 
testator’s perspective, the existence of family maintenance provisions 
makes it difficult to know exactly how the estate will be divided given 
that the testator’s wishes can be overridden.171 Second, in contrast to 
forced heirs, those who petition for an inheritance pursuant to a family 
maintenance statute do so without much certainty as to what, if anything, 
they are entitled. As Brashier describes, family maintenance statutes lack 
“well-defined guidelines to lend some element of certainty and 
predictability to the outcome of a claimant’s application against the 
                                                   
166. Ray D. Madoff, Lurking in the Shadow: The Unseen Hand of Doctrine in Dispute Resolution, 
76 S. CAL. L. REV. 161, 183–84 (2002). In contrast, in New Zealand “the only factor listed in the 
statute that courts may take into account is the decedent’s intent, and the conduct of the applicant 
[which] may disqualify him from receiving part of the estate.” Hargis, supra note 165, at 458 n.69. 
167. See Asadorian, supra note 22, at 112 (“The flexibility inherent in the family maintenance 
system speaks to the natural desire to protect children in need while allowing for some degree of 
testamentary freedom.”).  
168. See supra section I.B.1. 
169. See Asadorian, supra note 22, at 112 (“[P]roponents of the family maintenance model praise 
its protection of family members, particularly children, with the least possible interference with 
testamentary freedom.”). 
170. Mary A. Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession 
Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1188 (1986) (“English family provision legislation has ceased to be 
merely a way to provide maintenance for needy spouses and dependent children. It now serves as a 
charter that allows judges to devise a substantially new estate plan for the deceased in a courtroom 
setting with a potentially large and colorful cast of characters as petitioners.”); see also Susan N. 
Gary, Marital Partnership Theory and the Elective Share: Federal Estate Tax Law Provides a 
Solution, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 567, 581 (1995) (discussing how such an approach would “introduce 
a high degree of uncertainty into estate planning, an area in which consistency and predictability are 
important”). 
171. Brashier, Modern Family, supra note 18, at 132 (“Although the English courts have stated that 
theirs is not the prerogative to ignore or refashion the testator’s will in general, the testator can seldom 
if ever be certain that his last will and testament will be honored upon his death.”). 
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testator’s estate.”172 The standards are so “nebulous”173 that some have 
hypothesized that if the testator disinherited two different children who 
were similarly situated in all respects, each could still obtain different 
awards simply by filing their claims in different courts.174 Finally, critics 
note that the practical effect of these statutes is to recast the judge in the 
role of “surrogate testator,”175 which is problematic given that the judge 
must make such determinations “without any personal experience of the 
relevant facts”176 and, of course, after the testator is no longer around 
to  testify. 
Despite their limitations, the forced heirship system and the family 
maintenance statutes remain the two prevalent approaches for addressing 
the harms of child disinheritance. However, when it comes to the 
American law of succession, which places greater emphasis on 
testamentary freedom,177 each approach likely goes too far in curtailing 
that freedom. Both models would severely limit parents’ ability to 
disinherit their child, as forced heirships would prohibit such actions 
outright and family maintenance statutes would make it highly uncertain 
whether such actions would ever be given effect. Thus, it is the position 
of this Article that another approach is needed—one that limits the court’s 
discretion to override testamentary intent and yet, at the same time, 
safeguards the interests of those children most in need of protection. As 
detailed in the remainder of this Article, the doctrine of parens patriae 
provides a particularly appropriate means for achieving that balance. 
II. PARENS PATRIAE 
Often thought of as merely the state’s right to intervene in family affairs 
for purposes of protecting children, parens patriae is more broadly 
understood as both the right and the duty178 of the state “to make decisions 
                                                   
172. Id. at 125 (footnote omitted). 
173. BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW, supra note 84, at 109. 
174. Id. at 108 (“Under the system, courts address the question of disinheritance on a case-by-case 
basis and may provide substantially different awards from one case to the next.”); see also Andrew 
Watson Brown, China and the United States: Yin and Yank Intestacy, 59 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 239, 
254 (2019) (“Critics contend that the family maintenance model introduces unnecessary complexity 
and inconsistency into the probate system, thereby promoting litigation, increasing costs and depleting 
estates.”). 
175. Tate, supra note 8, at 141; see also Taite, supra note 31, at 338 (describing the New Zealand 
family maintenance statute as one that “abdicates a lot of power to the judicial system”). 
176. Tate, supra note 8, at 142.  
177. See supra section I.A; BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW, supra note 84, at 109 (“Americans 
appear to love their testamentary freedom more than do citizens in most countries . . . .”). 
178. Mary Koll, Growth, Interrupted: Nontherapeutic Growth Attenuation, Parental Medical 
Decision Making, and the Profoundly Developmentally Disabled Child’s Right to Bodily Integrity, 
2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 225, 244 (2010) (“Parens patriae confers on the state a ‘right, indeed, a duty, to 
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that are in the best interests of vulnerable persons.”179 The doctrine has a 
long and somewhat checkered history, having existed over the years in 
various incarnations and having been employed in a number of different 
contexts.180 Through it all, however, parens patriae has “exhibited a 
remarkable staying power,”181 and today enjoys a permanent place in 
American law.182 The purpose of this Part is to look more closely at this 
doctrine with an aim of better understanding the role it should ultimately 
play in the law of parental disinheritance. Before getting to what that role 
might look like, it is necessary to understand, first, the historical evolution 
of the doctrine and, second, how the doctrine currently operates within the 
realm of domestic relations. 
A. A Brief History 
The concept of parens patriae dates back to the seventeenth century 
with an origin story that has been described as “probably without parallel 
in the history of Anglo-American legal institutions.”183 That 
characterization comes from the fact that what is today an expansive legal 
doctrine owes its existence to a simple printing error. Parens patriae 
originally emerged as an extension of the Prerogative Regis,184 which 
“held that the King was personally sovereign and that he was to have 
preeminence over all within his kingdom.”185 In its earliest form, parens 
                                                   
protect children’ by intervening ‘in family matters to safeguard the child’s health.’”) (quoting In re 
Phillip B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979)). 
179. Id.; see also Jasmine E. Harris, Processing Disability, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 459 (2015) 
(describing the “parens patriae tradition of the state as ‘protector’ of vulnerable populations”). 
180.  George B. Curtis, The Checkered Career of Parens Patriae: The State as Parent or Tyrant?, 
25 DEPAUL L. REV. 895, 895 (1976) (“The term parens patriae has enjoyed or, better, endured a varied 
history of both usage and interpretation.”). 
181. Id.  
182. Id. (noting how “American courts have accepted this aspect of the sovereign prerogative and 
incorporated it into their decisional jurisprudence” and expanded upon it); see also Kevin A. 
Robinson, Has the Government Failed to Protect Us? A Discussion of HFCS & Other Added Sugars, 
14 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 365, 368 n.20 (2018) (“[S]tates often invoke parens patriae to protect 
the health and welfare of its people.”); Gregory A. Loken, Gratitude and the Map of Moral Duties 
Toward Children, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1121, 1122–23 (1999) (“Anglo/American law has always treated 
biological parents as responsible for their children’s welfare, and for at least the past century has 
recognized the parens patriae responsibility of the state toward children whose welfare is 
threatened.”). 
183. Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195, 195 (1978). 
184. Amelia C. Waller, State Standing in Police-Misconduct Cases: Expanding the Boundaries of 
Parens patriae, 16 GA. L. REV. 865, 873 n.50 (1982) (“Although the actual origins of the term parens 
patriae remain unclear, there is general agreement that it originated in the Prerogative Regis.”). 
185. Kenneth J. Figueroa, Immigrants and the Civil Rights Regime: Parens Patriae Standing, 
Foreign Governments and Protection from Private Discrimination, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 408, 431 
n.119 (2002). See also Curtis, supra note 180, at 896 (“Under this theory, the king could do no wrong; 
he could never die; he was the representative of the state in its dealings with foreign nations; he was 
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patriae only encompassed the Crown’s ability to protect “lunatics (the 
temporarily insane) and idiots (the permanently insane).”186 That all 
changed, however, in the 1722 case of Eyre v. Countess of Shaftsbury.187 
There, the court acknowledged the traditional understanding that parens 
patriae existed for the benefit of “idiots and lunatics, who are uncapable 
to take care of themselves” but then broadened the doctrine even further, 
adding that the traditional reasoning also justified “extend[ing] this care 
to infants.”188 In extending the doctrine to cover children, the court found 
support in Beverley’s Case,189 an opinion issued more than a hundred 
years earlier, which stated “[t]hat if an infant who cannot defend, govern, 
or order his lands, tenements, goods, or chattels, the King of right ought 
to have him in his custody, and to protect him.”190 Unbeknownst to the 
court, however, the publishers of Coke’s Reports, wherein the court had 
located the earlier case, had made a mistake.191 Specifically, when 
reproducing the text of Beverly’s Case, the book’s printer accidentally 
substituted the word “infant” for “idiot”—the word the issuing court had 
actually used.192 It would take over a hundred years before the error was 
corrected,193 but by then parens patriae was widely understood to permit 
state intervention on behalf of children although the exact reach of that 
doctrine would continue to evolve.194 
It was this basic understanding, however, that operated in the early laws 
of American colonies, each of which “imported the equitable powers of 
parens patriae to protect individuals who lacked the capacity to protect 
themselves.”195 Of course at that time only the Crown could exercise that 
                                                   
part of the legislature, the head of the army, the fountain of justice, always present in all his courts, 
the fountain of honor, the arbiter of commerce, the head of the church.”).  
186. Jack Ratliff, Parens Patriae: An Overview, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1847, 1850 (2000). 
187. 24 Eng. Rep. 659 (c. 1722). 
188. Custer, supra note 183, at 202–03 (quoting id. at 664). In this context, “infants” refers to 
children who have not yet reached the age of majority. See Robert L. Stenger, Exclusive or Concurrent 
Competence to Make Medical Decisions for Adolescents in the United States and United Kingdom, 
14 J. L. & HEALTH 209, 210 (2000) (“Those who have not reached the age of majority or adulthood, 
which at common law was twenty one and now generally is eighteen, were called ‘infants’, [sic] later 
‘children’ or ‘minors.’”). 
189. 76 Eng. Rep. 1118 (K.B. 1603). 
190. See Custer, supra note 183, at 203 (emphasis added). 
191. See 4 Coke’s Rep. 126b (London 1658). 
192. See Custer, supra note 183, at 203 (quoting id. at 1658). 
193. Id. at 204 (“Not until the 1826 edition was the error corrected so that the word ‘idiot’ appeared 
throughout the Beverley’s Case opinion.”). 
194. Ratliff, supra note 186, at 1850 (noting that, by the time the error was corrected, “the Eyre 
holding . . . was well entrenched as precedent”). 
195. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Reforming Public Interest Tort Law to Redress 
Public Health Epidemics, 14 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 331, 339 (2011). 
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authority.196 Given the connection between the doctrine and the 
monarchy, one might think that parens patriae would have ceased to exist 
once the colonies moved to a republican form of government. The 
doctrine, however, not only survived but soon found a home in the various 
state legislatures, “which often delegated the authority to protect minors 
and incompetents to the courts.”197 In 1839, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court, in Ex Parte Crouse,198 would become the first court in America to 
employ the term in a written opinion.199 In deciding whether the state 
could commit a child exhibiting “vicious conduct”200 to a juvenile 
detention facility without a trial by jury, the court began its opinion by 
posing a series of rhetorical questions: 
[M]ay not the natural parents, when unequal to the task of 
education, or unworthy of it, be superseded by the parens patriae, 
or common guardian of the community? It is to be remembered 
that the public has a paramount interest in the virtue and 
knowledge of its members, and that of strict right, the business of 
education belongs to it. That parents are ordinarily intrusted with 
it is because it can seldom be put into better hands; but where they 
are incompetent or corrupt, what is there to prevent the public 
from withdrawing their faculties, held, as they obviously are, at 
its sufferance?201 
Finding that the state’s power in this regard “cannot be doubted,” the 
court upheld the state’s right to detain the child.202 By 1890, the U.S. 
Supreme Court would declare that parens patriae was “inherent in the 
                                                   
196. Curtis, supra note 180, at 897 (“Initially, parens patriae established the king as a protector or 
supreme guardian of those classes threatened by forces beyond their control.”); see also Neil Howard 
Cogan, Juvenile Law, Before and After the Entrance of Parens Patriae, 22 S.C. L. REV. 147, 161 
(1970) (“[W]e can conclude that in the seventeenth century the king’s relation to idiots and lunatics 
was that of guardian to ward, that the guardianship was a duty of care rather than a source of profit.”). 
197. Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1208 (1974); see also Allan 
Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae, and the Attorney General as the Guardian of the 
State’s Natural Resources, 16 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 57, 68 (2005) (“After the American 
Revolution, the rights of the sovereign passed to the governments of the individual colonies.”); Late 
Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890) (“This 
prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every state, whether that power is 
lodged in a royal person, or in the legislature.”). 
198. 4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 1839). 
199. See Francine T. Sherman, Justice for Girls: Are We Making Progress?, 59 UCLA L. REV. 
1584, 1589 (2012) (describing the case as “the first articulation of the principle of parens patriae”). 
200. 4 Whart. 9, 10 (Pa. 1839). 
201. Id. at 11.  
202. Id.  
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supreme power of every state . . . for the prevention of injury to those who 
cannot protect themselves.”203 
As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Ex Parte Crouse 
makes clear, the reach of the parens patriae doctrine was growing. In 
England, the term had merely applied to the monarch’s ability to protect 
dependent children; but legal reformers in the nineteenth century would 
expand the doctrine to likewise empower the state to control delinquent 
children.204 Indeed, the doctrine has repeatedly proven itself to be quite 
adaptive—or as one commentator called it, “an absorptive doctrine”205—
and over time would be increasingly invoked to justify even greater 
governmental interventions. For instance, today the doctrine exists in a 
number of different contexts, “from protection of the mentally ill to the 
law of juvenile courts.”206 Additionally, parens patriae now protects more 
than just specific individuals who cannot care for themselves, but also 
encompasses public health, finding application in “environmental mass 
torts such as global warming, lead paint, handguns, tobacco, public 
hospitals, predatory lenders, environmental pollution, and 
climate  change.”207 
Despite its expansion, parens patriae continues to play an active, crucial 
role in the law of domestic relations. As John Kleinig explains, “parents 
sometimes fall unacceptably short of the moral minima that limit their 
paternalistic role . . . [a]nd so the state also exercises a parens patriae 
function . . . compel[ing] parents to act in certain ways toward their 
children.”208 The following section delves more deeply into the role that 
parens patriae plays in the realm of family law, looking at the history 
behind that interplay and the current understanding and application of 
the  doctrine. 
                                                   
203. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 
(1890). 
204. As George Curtis has noted, originally in England, “[t]he motivating reason to apply the parens 
patriae theory was the need to support and to care for children . . . who stood as a source of hope for the 
kingdom.” Curtis, supra note 180, at 899. Individuals who favored juvenile reform, however, “saw its 
application to the delinquent as ‘merely a logical extension of the principle of chancery and of guardianship.” 
Id. (quoting H. LOU, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1929)). 
205. Id. at 915. See also Claudine Columbres, Targeting Retail Discrimination with Parens 
Patriae, 36 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 209, 211 (2003) (describing parens patriae as an “enigmatic 
doctrine” that is sufficiently flexible “to adjust to modern circumstances”). 
206. Sarah Abramowicz, English Child Custody Law, 1660–1839: The Origins of Judicial 
Intervention in Paternal Custody, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1344, 1346–47 (1999). 
207. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Parens Patriae Litigation to Redress Societal 
Damages from the BP Oil Spill: The Latest Stage in the Evolution of Crimtorts, 29 UCLA J. ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y 45, 81–83 (2011) (internal citations omitted). 
208. JOHN KLEINIG, PATERNALISM 143–44 (1983). 
 
06 Higdon.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/20  11:46 PM 
2020] P. PATRIAE AND THE DISINHERITED CHILD 647 
 
B. Usage in Contemporary Family Law 
Within the law of domestic relations, parens patriae is understood to 
stand for the proposition that a parent’s right to direct the upbringing of a 
child is not absolute but must instead yield to the state’s interest in 
protecting the child from abuse and neglect.209 Stated differently, “[t]he 
state can override parental decision-making, but only when the parents are 
seriously violating their duties toward their children, when the health or 
well-being of a child is at risk.”210 But the state’s ability to intervene in an 
existing family is only one aspect of the parens patriae doctrine. The state 
has enormous legal power to act on behalf of its children. As Jeffrey 
Shulman explains, “[a]s parens patriae, the state has plenary power to 
legislate on behalf of the child. The interest of the state in its children is 
so broad ‘as to almost defy limitations.’”211 
It was pursuant to that power that state legislatures in the nineteenth 
century began expanding parens patriae to justify legal intervention not 
only for the benefit of those children who lacked parents or guardians, but 
also for those children being abused or neglected.212 Accordingly, “[t]he 
state as parens patriae, as an institution standing in loco parentis, had the 
right, indeed the duty, to take children out of homes where they were 
beaten or tortured; or in which they were starved or neglected.”213 In other 
words, parens patriae came to stand for the proposition that the state could 
enforce “a certain modicum of care in the upbringing of children.”214 This 
expansion brought with it the idea that children were individuals in their 
own right subject to the law’s protection and not merely the property of 
their parents215: “Traditionally, children’s rights were limited; however, 
                                                   
209. See Kay P. Kindred, supra note 33, at 521 (“Despite the weight imparted in both law and 
social policy to the parent-child relationship and to the values of family privacy, the state, in the proper 
exercise of its power as parens patriae, can require parents to prove proper food, clothing, shelter and 
medical care to their children.”). 
210. JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE FAMILY 
IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 262 (2011). 
211. JEFFREY SHULMAN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARENT 56 (2014) (quoting In re Lippincott, 124 
A. 532, 533 (N.J. Ch. 1944)). 
212. See Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 64 (2006) (“In 
the nineteenth century, state legislatures began enacting child abuse and neglect laws that authorized 
governmental intervention into abusive parent-child relationships.”). 
213. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 210, at 18; see also supra note 178. 
214. Neal Devins, Gender Justice and Its Critics, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1377, 1402 (1988). 
215. In the early nineteenth century, “children were treated essentially as property owned 
exclusively by the husband and father or, if illegitimate, by the mother.” Thomas L. Fowler & Ilene 
B. Nelson, Navigating Custody Waters Without A Polar Star: Third-Party Custody Proceedings After 
Petersen v. Rogers and Price v. Howard, 76 N.C. L. REV. 2145, 2154 (1998). Eventually, however, 
“in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century . . . public awareness, concern, and outrage 
over the treatment of children grew. The courts gradually acknowledged that states had parens patriae 
authority to protect children from abuse and cruelty and upheld criminal child abuse statutes.” Id. 
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the state grew more receptive to the concerns of children as it realized that 
children were not able to protect themselves from societal ills or parental 
abuse.”216 In the twentieth century, states would expand these laws even 
further to protect children not only from physical harm, but emotional 
harm as well.217 Under the doctrine of parens patriae, the states felt they 
had both a right and a duty to intervene.218 
To the extent there was any question regarding the states’ ability to 
interfere with parental decision-making, the answer came in 1944 with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Prince v. Massachusetts.219 There, Sarah 
Prince was the aunt and legal guardian of nine-year-old Betty, whom 
Sarah permitted to sell religious-themed magazines on a public street.220 
As a result, Sarah was convicted of violating the state’s child labor laws, 
and she appealed.221 In previous decisions, the Court had recognized the 
fundamental rights of parents (and legal guardians) to direct the 
upbringing of children.222 Relying on those precedents, Sarah claimed that 
her conviction infringed upon her “parental right as secured by the due 
process clause” of the Fourteenth Amendment.223 The Court, however, 
rejected her claim, stating as an initial matter that “the family itself is not 
beyond regulation in the public interest.”224 The Court then held that 
“[a]cting to guard the general interest in youth’s well being, the state as 
parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control by requiring school 
attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor and in many other 
ways.”225 Finding that “[p]arents may be free to become martyrs 
themselves . . . [but not] make martyrs of their children” before they reach 
                                                   
216. Christopher R. Pudelski, The Constitutional Fate of Mandatory Reporting Statutes and the 
Clergy-Communicant Privilege in a Post-Smith World, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 733 (2004). Despite 
these developments, it would take some time before the courts would truly recognize children’s rights 
independent of their parents. See Margaret F. Brinig, The Effect of Transaction Costs on the Market 
for Babies, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 553, 562 (1994) (“Despite the possibility that the state might 
act in parens patriae, the idea that children might have independent rights took another hundred years 
to develop.”). 
217. In re Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 421 N.E.2d 28, 36 (Mass. 1981) (observing that “[t]he State as 
parens patriae may act to protect minor children from serious physical or emotional harm”). 
218. See Daniel L. Hatcher, Purpose v. Power: Parens Patriae and Agency Self-Interest, 42 N.M. 
L. REV. 159, 164 (2012) (“As the doctrine began to appear in American jurisprudence, it provided not 
merely authority but a duty to the vulnerable—with a humanitarian and benign aim.”). 
219. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
220. Id. at 159–60. 
221. Id. at 159. 
222. Id. at 166 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510 (1925)). 
223. Id. at 164 (noting that “she rests squarely on freedom of religion under the First Amendment,” 
using the Fourteenth Amendment to apply the First Amendment to the states). 
224. Id. at 166 (“And neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation.”). 
225. Id. (emphasis added). 
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the age of majority, the Court upheld Prince’s conviction.226 In the 
following decades, the Supreme Court would regularly affirm this 
understanding of the states’ rights vis-à-vis parents.227 
In so ruling, the Supreme Court made clear that the overriding purpose 
of parens patriae is to protect society as a whole. Indeed, when describing 
the Court’s holding in Prince, one commentator observed that “although 
the Supreme Court recognizes the profound role parents play in shaping 
their children’s behaviors, it allows for state intervention not necessarily 
to protect youths’ rights but to protect the rights of society.”228 In fact, the 
Court itself would later characterize parens patriae as “a most beneficent 
function often necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity.”229 
This connection between children and society stems from the reality that 
the strength of humanity’s future is heavily dependent on the health and 
well-being of today’s children.230 Thus, parens patriae operates under the 
hope that “the child would save the state as well as the state the child.”231 
Today, state courts enjoy broad, inherent powers to protect children—
powers that go well beyond simply removing children from environments 
deemed abusive or neglectful.232 Courts are free to exercise these powers 
“whenever necessary” and through “whatever relief may be necessary to 
protect [the children’s] best interests.”233 Further, this duty arises even in 
the absence of any direction from the state legislature. After all, “each 
branch of government has concurrent powers and responsibilities that are 
                                                   
226. Id. at 170. 
227. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (pointing out 
the “Court’s assumption that a parent’s interests in a child must be balanced against the State’s long-
recognized interests as parens patriae”); Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 627 (1986) 
(“[S]tate law vests decisional responsibility in the parents, in the first instance, subject to review in 
exceptional cases by the State acting as parens patriae.”); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) 
(noting that “[c]hildren . . . are assumed to be subject to the control of their parents, and if parental 
control falters, the State must play its part as parens patriae”).  
228. ROGER J.R. LEVESQUE, ADOLESCENTS, SEX, AND THE LAW: PREPARING ADOLESCENTS FOR 
RESPONSIBLE CITIZENSHIP 40 (2000). 
229. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 207, at 80 (emphasis added) (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 
Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 485 U.S. 592, 600 (1982)). 
230. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) (“A democratic society rests, for its 
continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens.”). 
231. Curtis, supra note 180, at 902 (“[T]he purpose of such action was not solely to foster the well 
being of the child, but to protect the security and well being of the state.”).  
232. LaShanda Taylor, A Lawyer for Every Child: Client-Directed Representation in Dependency 
Cases, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 605, 608 n.19 (2009) (“The state is the supreme guardian of all children 
within its jurisdiction and state courts have the inherent power to intervene to protect the best interests 
of children whose welfare is jeopardized.”). 
233. Kristina v. Foehrkolb, Comment, When the Child’s Best Interest Calls for It: Post-Adoption Contact 
by Court Order in Maryland, 71 MD. L. REV. 490, 493–94 (2012) (internal quotations omitted). 
 
06 Higdon.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/20  11:46 PM 
650 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:619 
 
in the nature of parens patriae.”234 Thus, under parens patriae authority, 
the court has a duty to protect “the best interests of children in actions 
before the court, even if the Legislature has not determined what the best 
interests require in a particular situation.”235 
Exercising this authority, courts have refused to enforce parental 
directives in a number of contexts when those decisions are incompatible 
with a child’s best interest. One such example relates to settlement 
agreements, wherein courts are free to reject “provisions of agreements 
between spouses affecting custody, visitation, child support, and 
relocation of a custodial parent.”236 Consider for instance the case of 
Delamielleure v. Belote,237 in which a divorcing couple included a 
provision in the settlement agreement stating that the child’s domicile 
would be determined by the mother.238 In that same provision, both parties 
waived a requirement under state law that restricted a custodial parent’s 
ability to move the child more than 100 miles away.239 Nonetheless, when 
the mother subsequently attempted to move the child out of state, the 
father brought a claim arguing that the waiver provision was invalid.240 
The court agreed, refusing to enforce that portion of the agreement and 
holding that “parenting time is not merely a right of the parent, but also a 
right of a child and thus . . . even if the parties’ rights could be and were 
waived, the child’s rights—and the parents’ obligations—were not and 
could not be waived by the divorce settlement.”241 
Courts have likewise used their parens patriae authority in other 
contexts—for example, in refusing to enforce liability waivers signed by 
a child’s parent. In Cooper v. Aspen Skiing Co.,242 a seventeen-year-old 
                                                   
234. In re D.S., 763 N.E.2d 251, 261 (Ill. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). In terms of how 
parens patriae operates in the other branches of government, the court’s opinion offers some 
examples. For instance, the court mentioned legislation designed to “to secure the best interests of the 
minor and the community,” and regarding the executive branch, the court referenced the discretion of 
the State’s Attorney to prosecute cases relating to child maltreatment. Id. at 258–59. 
235. E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 890 (Mass. 1999); see also Margaret S. Thomas, Parens 
Patriae and the States’ Historic Police Power, 69 SMU L. REV. 759, 797 (2016) (“This is true even 
in the absence of statutory authority for the parens patriae power: lower courts continue to rely instead 
on the common law sovereignty narrative articulated by the Supreme Court when statutory 
authority  fails.”).  
236. Bix, supra note 34, at 260; see also Dewhurst v. Dewhurst, 5 A.3d 23, 26 (Me. 2010) (“The 
court must independently evaluate a settlement agreement involving minor children to ensure custody 
matters are resolved according to the children’s best interest.”). 
237. 704 N.W.2d 746 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005). 
238. Id. at 748. 
239. Id. 
240. Id. 
241. Id. at 749 (“[T]his Court has taken a dim view of agreements purporting to sign away the 
rights of a child.”) (quoting Van Laar v. Rozema, 288 N.W.2d 667, 669 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980)). 
242. 48 P.3d 1229 (Colo. 2002). 
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boy brought suit after being severely injured while taking skiing lessons 
from the defendant.243 The defendant sought summary judgment on the 
basis that, prior to that incident, the child’s mother had signed a liability 
waiver.244 To illustrate, consider a New York case in which a couple had 
formalized an adoption using a Mexican court.245 In applying for the 
issuance of a New York birth certificate, the court refused, finding that 
the Mexican court lacked jurisdiction, despite the fact that both the birth 
mother and the adoptive parents had consented.246 In so ruling, the court 
held that, in New York, “the welfare of its children is one of its strongest 
public policies. To lend an imprimatur to an adoption, predicated upon 
insufficient jurisdictional foundations and a questionable perfunctory 
examination into the interests of the child, would be an inexcusable 
abdication of the State’s role as parens patriae.”247 
In sum, despite owing its existence to a typographical error,248 parens 
patriae has secured not only a crucial but an expansive role in the law of 
domestic relations within the United States, conferring upon courts an 
inherent right and an affirmative duty to protect children from the actions 
of their parents. In essence, parens patriae, “gives the state authority to 
serve as a substitute parent and ultimate protector of children’s 
interests.”249 And, in carrying out that role, “the right of parents . . . may 
be enlarged, restrained, and limited as the wisdom or policy of the times 
may dictate.”250 
III. WHEN DISINHERITANCE BECOMES A FORM OF ABUSE 
OR NEGLECT 
Just as courts invoke their parens patriae authority when refusing to 
enforce other parental directives,251 it is the position of this Article that 
courts must likewise refuse to enforce testamentary schemes that 
                                                   
243. Id. at 1230. 
244. Id. 
245. Barry E. v. Ingraham, 371 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y. 1977).  
246. Id. at 496 (“[N]o more than the naked and inadequate ‘jurisdictional’ facts recited in the 
Mexican order were produced.”). 
247. Id. at 496. 
248. See supra notes 183–194 and accompanying text. 
249. Kindred, supra note 33, at 526.  
250. Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C. L. 
REV. 205, 221 (1971) (quoting United States v. Bainbridge, 24 F. Cas. 946 (C.C.D. Mass. 1816)); see 
also Joan Neisser, Disclosing Adolescent Suicidal Impulses to Parents: Protecting the Child or the 
Confidence?, 26 IND. L. REV. 433, 466 (1993) (“[T]he state’s parens patriae interest in protecting 
children allows it to curtail the rights of parents when their actions are harmful to their child.”); Dayna 
B. Royal, Jon & Kate Plus the State: Why Congress Should Protect Children in Reality Programming, 
43 AKRON L. REV. 435, 486 (2010) (“Parens patriae authority enables the state to curtail parental 
control in various arenas for a number of legitimate reasons.”). 
251. See supra notes 236–248 and accompanying text. 
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constitute parental abuse or neglect. To protect against such harm, this 
Article proposes that, when it comes to “vulnerable child heirs”—defined 
here as minor children, adult disabled children who remain dependent, 
and adult children who were abused by the testator parent—any attempts 
by a parent at disinheritance should fail unless it can be shown that the 
parent has otherwise provided for the child in an amount sufficient to 
satisfy the parent’s obligation. 
In making such a proposal, it may initially seem a radical departure 
from the American law of succession or, more specifically, from the 
venerated role testamentary freedom has been permitted to occupy within 
that sphere. For that reason, this Part first explains why reform is 
necessary and why parens patriae is the appropriate vehicle for 
implementing such reform, before discussing the specifics of how the 
proposal would operate for each of the three categories of children. 
Part IV will then focus on how such an approach might operate, looking 
specifically at the children who would be protected from disinheritance, 
what evidence would be necessary to prove abuse or neglect in the 
testamentary context, and what would be the appropriate remedy. 
A. Vulnerable Child Heirs and the Evolving Family 
Few would disagree that the law should protect children from abuse 
and neglect. Indeed, protecting children from these harms is 
unquestionably a compelling state interest, and the law is replete with 
rules designed to do just that.252 As detailed earlier, however, the law of 
succession is a notable exception.253 Shielded by testamentary freedom, a 
parent can effectively use death as a way to financially abandon a child 
and instead make the child a ward of the state, which is then responsible 
for any resulting financial harms the disinheritance might have caused. 
Thus, American law affords a testator the right to not only “choose who 
will succeed to things of value left behind at death,”254 but to do so in a 
way that is harmful to the testator’s child. This approach, of course, is 
nothing new—the United States has always permitted parents to disinherit 
                                                   
252. See Laura Oren, The State’s Failure to Protect Children and Substantive Due Process: 
Deshaney in Context, 68 N.C. L. REV. 659, 712 n.401 (1990) (“Children are the object of legislative 
and judicial solicitude that has created protective structures of one kind or another.”). 
253. See supra section I.A. 
254. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of Succession in Social Perspective, in DEATH, TAXES AND 
FAMILY PROPERTY, supra note 57, at 9, 12; see also Ray D. Madoff, A Tale of Two Countries: 
Comparing the Law of Inheritance in Two Seemingly Opposite Systems, 37 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 333, 334 (2014) (“Freedom of testation gives people the ability to distribute their property at 
death as they wish—even to the exclusion of their family members and even if the decedent’s children 
become wards of the state as a result of the disinheritance.”). 
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their children.255 Nonetheless, given that children are increasingly at risk 
of disinheritance and some of these children are particularly vulnerable to 
economic harm, a change in the law is now required for several reasons. 
First, the American family is evolving and laws that might once have 
protected children from the financial harms of disinheritance have become 
increasingly obsolete. As noted earlier, one of the justifications for child 
disinheritance resides in the belief that bequests to the testator’s spouse 
will provide a “trickle down” benefit for the testator’s children given that 
the surviving spouse remains subject to state laws requiring parents to 
support their children.256 The problem with this rationale, however, is that 
it assumes that the testator’s surviving spouse, in fact, enjoys a parent-
child relationship with the testator’s surviving children. With the rise in 
divorce, remarriage, and cohabitation, one can no longer assume that to 
be true.257 Instead, at the time of a testator’s death, his or her children are 
less likely to be the children of the testator’s spouse.258 In such situations, 
the testator’s spouse would have “no legal obligation and may have little 
emotional incentive to use her elective share for their benefit.”259 
Additionally, with these changes to the American family, testators may 
disinherit a child not simply because they have moved on to a new 
relationship, but out of spite for past, failed relationships.260 As Ralph 
Brashier explains, “[f]amilies frequently splinter and parents form new 
attachments and nurse old grudges toward former family 
members . . . [and, thus,] the incidence of child disinheritance is likely to 
increase.”261 For example, “following a bitter divorce dispute, the 
noncustodial parent may disinherit his minor child as one last slap at the 
                                                   
255. See supra section I.A. 
256. See supra notes 102 and accompanying text. 
257. See Brashier, Modern Family, supra note 18, at 163 (“When ‘family’ meant two heterosexual, 
married parents and their children, unaffected by divorce and remarriage, the elective share system 
was more effective and thus more justifiable than it is now.”). 
258. See Asadorian, supra note 22, at 121 (“In these situations, money left to the surviving spouse 
is not money that is, in essence, indirectly left to the minor children.”); Brashier, Modern Family, 
supra note 18, at 163 (“Today . . . large numbers of minor children are denied this indirect protection 
from disinheritance because in our multiple marriage society the surviving spouse often is not the 
parent of the testator’s minor children.”). 
259. Brashier, Modern Family, supra note 18, at 116 (“Moreover, she quite often will have minor 
children who are not those of the testator; ironically, the conduit effect will inure to their benefit 
(because of her legal obligation of support) while the testator’s own disinherited children are 
excluded.”); see also Waggoner, supra note 116, at 233 (“When a decedent is survived by children 
not descended from the surviving spouse, or by children of the surviving spouse not descended from 
the decedent, the decedent has a surviving spouse with divided loyalties and, hence, a spouse who is 
a less reliable conduit.”). 
260. See Asadorian, supra note 22, at 108 (noting that “parents may disinherit their children out of 
anger or spite for the custodial parent or child”). 
261. BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW, supra note 132, at 103.  
 
06 Higdon.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/20  11:46 PM 
654 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:619 
 
custodial parent or the child.”262 Thus, the law must recognize that 
children now enjoy varying levels of legal protection from disinheritance 
based largely on the relationship histories of their parents. As one 
commentator has concluded: “The law should not implicitly sanction this 
disproportionate treatment of children who, through no fault of their own, 
do not reside with both of their biological parents.”263 
Although some courts have attempted to deal with this problem through 
expansive application of principles like undue influence, fraud, and 
capacity,264 the law requires a solution that is more consistent and more 
effective. Those principles were never intended to shield children from 
the harms of disinheritance but were instead aimed at safeguarding 
testamentary intent.265 The fact that currently no protections exist against 
child disinheritance does not mean that the best solution is to, at the 
judge’s discretion, expand other principles of succession law to fill that 
void.266 Instead, the law requires a more intentional approach—one that 
depends, not on a creative remedy that a judge may or may not impose, 
but one that is both mandated by the law and also tailored to protect those 
most in need. Currently, by permitting testators to indiscriminately 
disinherit children, some of our country’s most vulnerable citizens—
citizens the state has an affirmative duty to protect—are left to the mercy 
of the dead hand. Quite simply, those children deserve more meaningful 
protections than that provided by the haphazard use of inapposite 
legal  doctrines. 
After all, disinheritance can be quite devastating. Other countries are 
so concerned about these harms that they have made it virtually 
impossible for testators to disinherit any of their children.267 This Article 
does not go that far; instead, it advocates for an approach that focuses on 
three categories of children: minor children, adult children who remain 
dependent upon their parents as a result of a disability, and adult survivors 
of child abuse. As discussed below, the children who occupy these three 
                                                   
262. Brashier, Protecting the Child, supra note 16, at 9–10; see also Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 
376 N.E.2d 1382, 1391 (Ill. 1978) (“[T]he divorced parent may harbor animosity toward a former 
spouse, which disposition might obscure the natural tendency to provide in a will for their mutual 
children.”). 
263. Asadorian, supra note 22, at 121. 
264. See supra notes 120–127 and accompanying text. 
265. See Leslie, supra note 53, at 236–37 (“[C]ourts faced with an offensive will often use other 
doctrines ostensibly designed to ascertain whether the testator formulated testamentary intent—
doctrines such as capacity, undue influence and fraud—to frustrate the testator’s intent and distribute 
estate assets to family members.”). 
266. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 66, at 96 (noting that “[w]hether a court actually finds undue 
influence depends on the facts of each case—plus social norms and the court’s own prejudices and 
opinions. The cases thus are very dependent on time and place”). 
267. See supra section I.B. 
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categories are the most susceptible to harm should they face 
disinheritance. After all, for minor children and disabled adult children, 
inheritance may be the only thing preventing them from becoming wards 
of the state. The same is likely true for adult survivors of child abuse given 
the financial, educational, and health consequences they typically suffer 
as result of having been abused by the very parent now attempting to 
disinherit them.268 Thus, for a state to deny these individuals any hope of 
protection would run afoul of its parens patriae duty “to protect children 
whose vulnerable lives or psychological well-being may have been 
harmed or may be seriously endangered by a neglectful or 
abusive  parent.”269 
1. Minor Children 
Courts and legal commentators alike frequently refer to minor children 
as our nation’s most vulnerable citizens—a characterization that stems 
from the innate differences between children and adults. As Elizabeth 
Scott explains, 
children are dependent on others—initially, for survival and, as 
they grow, for the care that will enable them to mature to 
adulthood. This dependency means that others provide for their 
basic needs—for food, shelter, health care, affection, and 
education—so that they may become healthy, productive 
members of society. Children also lack the capacity to make 
sound decisions. Because of their immature cognitive 
development, children are unable to employ reasoning and 
understanding sufficiently to make choices on the basis of a 
rational decision-making process . . . . This decision-making 
immaturity warrants giving others authority over important 
decisions affecting children’s lives.270 
For those reasons, the law imposes a number of duties upon parents to 
support and protect their children with the basic understanding that “each 
parent has an obligation to nurture his [or her] children until they reach 
                                                   
268. See infra section III.A.3. 
269. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 48 A.3d 1075, 1090 (N.J. 2012); see also Late 
Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890) 
(noting that “parens patriae . . . . is a most beneficent function, and often necessary to be exercised 
in the interests of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves”). 
270. Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 550 (2000). 
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adulthood.”271 And, as detailed earlier, when parents fail to live up to those 
responsibilities, parens patriae permits the state to intervene.272 
Accordingly, “[t]he importance of parental support of minor children 
has both moral and economic dimensions.”273 Citing those interests, legal 
scholars have taken particular issue with a parent’s ability to disinherit 
minor children.274 As one commentator put it, “[w]hen we recognize that 
the testator’s estate will do him no good in death, his act of disinheriting 
his minor child seems to be the ultimate abnegation of societal and moral 
responsibility.”275 The minor child is, after all, “a dependent who would 
not exist but for the presence of the testator himself.”276 Further, 
dependent children play no role in family formation given that they cannot 
“voluntarily or knowingly establish the family relationship with 
the  testator.”277 
What makes the minor children particularly vulnerable to the harms of 
disinheritance is their inability to safeguard their interests. Adult family 
members who might fear disinheritance—including spouses, were they 
not already protected from disinheritance278—are capable of “acquiring, 
earning, managing, and protecting significant property interests” as a 
means of protecting themselves from the financial harms of 
disinheritance.279 Minor children possess no such ability but instead are at 
the mercy of their parents.280 In fact, minor children typically do not even 
                                                   
271. Brashier, Protecting the Child, supra note 16, at 4; see also Accent Serv. Co. v. Ebsen, 306 
N.W.2d 575, 576 (Neb. 1981) (“[E]ven in the absence of statute, parents are under a legal as well as 
a moral obligation to support, maintain, and care for their children, the basis of such a duty resting 
not only upon the fact of the parent-child relationship, but also upon the interest of the state as parens 
patriae of children and of the community at large in preventing them from becoming a public 
burden.”); Taite, supra note 31, at 325 (“Mandating financial responsibility for the care of children 
during one’s lifetime is without question.”).  
272. See supra section II.B. 
273. Asadorian, supra note 22, at 103. 
274. See, e.g., Batts, supra note 1, at 1255 (proposing that “when there are surviving minor or 
dependent children, their needs must be met before” other family members and dependents); Brashier, 
Protecting the Child, supra note 16, at 3 (characterizing the lack of protection for minor children as 
“particularly disconcerting in a country that pays great lip service to ensuring the well-being of its 
youth”); Brennan, supra note 101, at 126 (advocating for “more legislation to benefit dependent 
surviving minors”) . 
275. Brashier, Protecting the Child, supra note 16, at 21 (“The history and policy of testamentary 
freedom are insufficient reasons for continuing to permit the disinheritance of one’s minor children.”). 
276. Id. at 20. 
277. Batts, supra note 1, at 1200. 
278. See supra notes 75–80 and accompanying text. 
279. Brashier, Modern Family, supra note 18, at 86. 
280. See Jan E. Rein, A More Rational System for the Protection of Family Members Against 
Disinheritance: A Critique of Washington’s Pretermitted Child Statute and Other Matters, 15 GONZ. 
L. REV. 11, 47 (1979) (“Spouses, after all, enter into the husband-wife relationship voluntarily at an 
age when they can protect their interests while children do not volunteer to be brought into the parent-
child relationship thrust upon them at birth.”). 
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possess the reciprocal right to disinherit their parents: “in most states a 
child under eighteen cannot make a will, [and thus] the child cannot 
disinherit her parent. Ironically, the effect is that the parent receives the 
benefit of forced heirship which is denied to his child.”281 
2. Adult Children Who Remain Dependent Due to Disability 
Because an adult child is typically more capable of protecting their own 
interests, the state’s parens patriae authority greatly diminishes when a 
child reaches adulthood.282 For that reason, at least one scholar has opined 
that “disinheritance of one’s adult children is much less objectionable than 
disinheritance of one’s minor children who are as yet incompetent to 
provide for themselves.”283 However, not all adult children are similarly 
situated, and some continue to fall into the category of vulnerable persons 
that the doctrine of parens patriae was designed to protect. Within this 
category are adult children who remain dependent upon their parents as a 
result of a disability. As one commentator describes, “[l]ike minor 
children, adult children who are incapable of self-care because of mental 
or physical disabilities are vulnerable and in special need of their parents’ 
time and attention.”284 
Blackstone himself wrote that “[n]o person is bound to provide a 
maintenance for his issue unless where the children are impotent, either 
through infancy, disease or accident[.]”285 Today, the majority of states 
agree, requiring parents to support adult children who, as a result of a 
disability that occurred during the child’s minority, remain dependent 
upon the parent.286 One of the earliest states to recognize such a duty was 
Kentucky, where in 1908, the highest court of the state recognized that 
“[a]n adult child may from accident or disease be as helpless and 
                                                   
281. Brashier, Modern Family, supra note 18, at 170. 
282. See, e.g., Vincent A. Cirillo, Curtis v. Kline: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court Declares Act 
62 Unconstitutional—A Triumph for Equal Protection Law, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 471, 487 n.107 (1996) 
(“Regulating filial relationships between adults when it comes to matters such as custody or support 
of minor children can be rationalized purely on the basis of the child’s minority and the doctrine of 
parens patriae. This is not applicable, however, in matters between parents and adult children.”). 
283. Brashier, Protecting the Child, supra note 16, at 8. 
284. Jennifer H. Kaplan, Note, Administrative Law—Navarro v. Pfizer Corporation: Too Much 
Disregard and Too Little Deference in Defining “Disability” Under the Family and Medical Leave 
Act, 25 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 263, 268 (2003). 
285. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 437 (1765). 
286. See Sande L. Buhai, Parental Support of Adult Children with Disabilities, 91 MINN. L. REV. 
710, 721 (2007) (noting that only nine states follow “the common law rule that does not extend a 
parent’s duty beyond the child’s minority, regardless of existing or subsequent disabilities”); Tate, 
supra note 8, at 162 (“Most states require parents to support a disabled adult child, at least if the 
disability arose before the child reached the age of majority.”). 
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incapable of making his support as an infant.”287 Accordingly, the court 
held that there was “no difference in principle between the duty imposed 
upon the parent to support the infant and the obligation to care for the 
adult, who is equally, if not more, dependent upon the parent.”288 
Although there is some debate regarding what forms of disability 
justify the legal duty to continue support past the age of minority and how 
long such an obligation should extend,289 the point here is merely that, 
once a parent has assumed that duty vis-à-vis an adult child, that child 
becomes particularly vulnerable should the parent die without leaving the 
child an adequate source of support. Adult disabled children who do find 
themselves disinherited are likely to rely on the state for assistance290—
an externality that, as explained below,291 other exceptions to testamentary 
freedom strive to prevent. 
It should be noted, however, that some parents disinherit adult, disabled 
children not out of spite or malice, but out of kindness and practicality. As 
Judith McMullen explains, 
disinheritance is sometimes regarded by parents as the lesser of 
two evils. When disabled adult children have financial needs 
beyond what a parent could provide, the parent may allow the 
child to be emancipated, and the child will be eligible for public 
benefit programs. However, benefit programs have strict 
eligibility requirements. Any financial windfall, such as an 
inheritance, will make the child ineligible for benefits programs. 
Money from a support trust will have the same effect. In addition, 
any funds received by the disabled child may be immediately 
targeted for repayment of past expenses paid by the state.292 
Such concerns would, of course, exist only for those adult children 
receiving certain benefits. Nonetheless, should states try to protect those 
children from disinheritance, both the state and federal government may 
need to revisit eligibility requirements for these programs, focusing on 
how to prevent parents from using disinheritance as a means to shift the 
entire cost of their child’s care onto the government yet, at the same time, 
                                                   
287. Crain v. Mallone, 113 S.W. 67, 68 (Ky. 1908). 
288. Id. 
289. See Buhai, supra note 286, at 712 (questioning whether courts should “recognize a legally 
enforceable requirement that parents support their adult children with disabilities indefinitely 
regardless of the type of disability, the age of onset, or the family relationship”). 
290. See Katherine B. McCoy, Note, The Growing Need for Third-Party Special Needs Trust 
Reform, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 461, 478 (2014) (noting that “many disabled individuals cannot 
maintain an adequate quality of life without relying” at least in part, on government assistance). 
291. See infra section III.B.2. 
292. McMullen, supra note 102, at 360 n.107.  
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how to ensure that inheritance cannot thwart an individual’s ability to 
continue receiving essential benefits. 
3. Adult Survivors of Child Abuse 
It is unclear the extent to which abusive parents resort to disinheritance 
as a means of inflicting even greater abuse on their children. A survey of 
prior cases provides little guidance given that “most cases of child 
disinheritance do not reach the courts, because the children (or their 
representatives) know that the testator’s act is legally permissible even 
when morally reprehensible.”293 Nonetheless, instances where children 
have alleged disinheritance as a form of parental abuse do exist. The facts 
of Merrick v. Helter,294 discussed in the Introduction, provide one such 
example.295 Perhaps the most famous case, however, involves the 
legendary screen actress Joan Crawford. In the 1940s, Crawford adopted 
two children, Christina and Christopher.296 When Crawford died in 1977, 
she left a will that disinherited both of them: “It is my intention to make 
no provision herein for my son Christopher or my daughter Christina for 
reasons which are well known to them.”297 Subsequently, Christina 
Crawford wrote Mommie Dearest, a best-selling book in which she 
detailed years of abuse she and Christopher had endured at the hands of 
their mother.298 In that book, Christina explained the connection between 
the disinheritance by her mother and the earlier abuse: “She had gone out 
of this life carrying all the years of hatred and cruelty and violent rage 
with her, clutching at the torment of it as though it were just yesterday.”299 
Regardless of the frequency with which abusive parents disinherit their 
children, the more salient point is how particularly vulnerable those 
children are to the harms of disinheritance. To understand why, one need 
only consult the numerous studies that have documented the debilitating 
harms that result from child abuse—harms that can last a lifetime. Social 
                                                   
293. BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW, supra note 132, at 105. 
294. 500 S.W.3d 671, 672 n.1 (Tex. App. 2016). 
295. See supra notes 2–7 and accompanying text. 
296. See Elizabeth C. Hirschman, Motherhood in the Movies—1942 to 2010: Social Class Mobility 
and Economic Power, in MOTHERHOOD, MARKETS AND CONSUMPTION: THE MAKING OF MOTHERS 
IN CONTEMPORARY WESTERN CULTURES 17, 24 (Stephanie O’Donoghue et al., eds. 2016). 
297. See CHARLOTTE CHANDLER, NOT THE GIRL NEXT DOOR: JOAN CRAWFORD, A PERSONAL 
BIOGRAPHY 281 (2008). She did, however, leave an estate valued at $2 million and bequeathed her 
other two adopted children more than $75,000 each. Id.  
298. CHRISTINA CRAWFORD, MOMMIE DEAREST (1978). 
299. Id. at 672. The children did challenge the will and ultimately received a small amount. See 
LAWRENCE J. QUIRK & WILLIAM SCHOELL, JOAN CRAWFORD: THE ESSENTIAL BIOGRAPHY 253 
(2002) (“The estate lawyers gave Christina a settlement of approximately $55,000, but after paying 
off her own lawyers and splitting the rest with her brother, she got little more than ten thousand, a far 
cry from what she’d been hoping for.”). 
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scientists have broken these harms down into three categories: physical 
health consequences, psychological consequences, and behavioral 
consequences.300 In terms of physical harms, adults who were abused as 
children—as compared to the general population—have been shown to 
suffer higher rates of, inter alia, high blood pressure, diabetes, vision 
problems, heart attacks, bowel disease, and stroke.301 Psychologically, 
they also suffer greater incidences of post-traumatic stress, anxiety, 
attachment disorders, and depression.302 Finally, adult survivors of child 
abuse exhibit a number of behavioral consequences, including drug and 
alcohol dependency, “juvenile delinquency leading to adult 
criminality[,]”303 lower educational attainment,304 and unemployment.305 
For adult survivors of child abuse who might be suffering from any of 
these harms, disinheritance would be particularly harmful given that 
inheritance might be all the child has to help deal with those 
consequences—consequences that arose from the harms inflicted upon the 
child during his or her minority. As noted earlier, the state has a particular 
interest in protecting minor children from such abuse and neglect.306 
Although incapable of protecting all children at all times from abuse, the 
state can and should refrain from perpetuating that abuse when it comes 
in the form of a testamentary document the state is being asked to probate. 
Arguably, the state may even be required to do so. After all, although 
reasonable minds might disagree on the precise scope of parens patriae, 
seemingly all would agree that the state is precluded from acting in such 
a way as to exacerbate the abuse of a child.307 
                                                   
300. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD’S BUREAU, CHILD WELFARE 
INFORMATION GATEWAY, CHILDREN’S BUREAU LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CHILD ABUSE AND 
NEGLECT FACTSHEET (2019), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs/long_term_consequences.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HHH9-BHHX].  
301. Id. at 2. 
302. Id. at 3; see also KATHLEEN A. KENDALL-TACKETT, THE HIDDEN FEELINGS OF 
MOTHERHOOD: COPING WITH STRESS, DEPRESSION, AND BURNOUT 138 (2001) (“Many adult 
survivors of physical, sexual or severe emotional abuse show symptoms of PTSD.”). 
303. CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, supra note 300, at 4. 
304. See Kristen W. Springer et al., The Long-term Health Outcomes of Childhood Abuse: An 
Overview and a Call to Action, 18 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 864, 866–67 (2003) (noting the 
“substantial body of literature linking childhood abuse with poor educational outcomes”). 
305. See Ruth Gilbert et al., Burden and Consequences of Child Maltreatment in High-Income 
Countries, 373 LANCET 68, 74 (2009) (describing studies that found that “significantly more of the 
abused and neglected individuals were in menial and semi-skilled occupations than were controls 
(62% vs 45%) at 29 years of age, and fewer had remained in employment during the past 5 years 
(41% vs 58%)”). 
306. See supra section II. 
307. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 207 (1989) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing prior cases supporting that proposition) (noting that “a State may be 
found complicit in an injury even if it did not create the situation that caused the harm”). Although 
the majority in that opinion concluded “that a State’s failure to protect an individual against private 
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B. Parens Patriae Protects Vulnerable Child Heirs Without Unduly 
Restricting Testamentary Freedom 
As discussed above, reform is necessary not only due to the changing 
American family, which puts a growing number of children at risk of 
disinheritance, but also the magnitude of harm disinheritance can cause 
certain classes of children. It is the position of this Article that an approach 
based on parens patriae would allow for a solution to these problems that 
is more consistent with the existing law of succession. Again, American 
law is very much concerned with preserving the rights of testators to 
control how their property will be distributed after their death.308 In this 
regard, the law appears to reflect public opinion.309 Consider, for instance, 
a study that asked Americans living in five different states the following 
question: “Should the law limit inheritance to either relatives, to friends 
of long standing, or to organizations to which an individual has had a long 
time connection or should there be no restrictions at all on the way a 
person distributes his property?”310 Eighty-nine percent of respondents 
said there should be no restrictions whatsoever.311 Interestingly enough, 
however, when those same individuals were questioned about more 
specific situations, their commitment to testamentary freedom waned. For 
example, when asked whether testators should be permitted to leave their 
estate to a pet, fifty-four percent of respondents said no.312 
A similar dynamic emerges when Americans are surveyed about child 
disinheritance. In a study that asked participants whether the law should 
permit a testator parent to devise property to individuals outside of the 
family and leave nothing to the testator’s children, over ninety-three 
percent responded that a parent should not have the right to disinherit 
children under twenty-one years of age.313 Even when asked about adult 
children, over sixty-three percent responded that a testator should not be 
permitted to disinherit those children over the age of twenty one.314 
                                                   
violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause,” it also acknowledged that 
the state in that case had not taken any action that would render the child in question “more 
vulnerable” to harm. Id. at 197. 
308. See supra section I.A. 
309. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 66, at 46 (describing testamentary freedom as both a “fundamental 
principle of law” and a “fundamental social norm”). 
310. Mary Louise Fellows, Rita J. Simon & William Rau, Public Attitudes About Property 
Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. 
J. 319, 335 (1978) (emphasis omitted). 
311. Id. at 336. 
312. Id. 
313. See JULIUS COHEN, REGINALD A.H. ROBSON, & ALAN BATES, PARENTAL AUTHORITY: THE 
COMMUNITY AND THE LAW 77, tbl.12 (1958). 
314. Id. 
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Results like these have led one commentator to conclude that, at the very 
least, “Americans would be amenable to laws that would specifically 
outlaw the disinheritance of minor children.”315 
Regardless, this Article is not proposing such a sweeping change in the 
law. Instead, this Article is advocating for an approach whereby a court, 
using its inherent parens patriae authority, will not enforce a testator’s 
attempt to disinherit a vulnerable child heir if that disinheritance would 
subject the child to abuse or neglect. By taking this approach, testators 
will retain much of the testamentary freedom that the law currently 
provides, and the few limitations it does impose are consistent with the 
existing exceptions to testamentary freedom. 
1. Preserving Testamentary Freedom 
As an initial point, this proposal would largely preserve testators’ 
ability to disinherit most children. The proposal only covers those children 
who qualify as a vulnerable child heir, which again is limited to minor 
children, adult children who remain dependent on their parents as a result 
of a disability, and adult children who were abused by the testator parent 
during their minority. Even then, a court would still enforce the testator’s 
attempt at disinheritance so long as there was evidence that the testator 
had otherwise discharged his or her obligations toward the child in 
question. Given these two limitations, this proposal is far less intrusive 
than the systems developed by other countries to protect children 
from disinheritance. 
First, the proposal only applies to a discrete subset of children. Unlike 
forced heirships where all children regardless of age or need are 
guaranteed a certain percentage of their parent’s estate,316 the only 
children who could even attempt to claim the benefit of this proposal are 
limited to those who fall into these three categories. Similarly, this 
proposal avoids the problem of the wide discretion and uncertainty that 
exists in family maintenance statues, whereby judges are permitted to 
consider petitions by any of the testator’s children (and, in some cases, 
dependents) and then substitute their own decision about how a testator 
should have directed the disposition of the property.317 In both of these 
international approaches, a testator is effectively prevented from ever 
disinheriting a child. This proposal, on the other hand, continues to 
provide parents the option of disinheriting most children, subject only to 
limited exceptions. In advocating for such an approach, this proposal is 
                                                   
315. Asadorian, supra note 22, at 125. 
316. See supra section I.B.1. 
317. See supra section I.B.2. 
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mindful of the traditional justifications behind permitting child 
disinheritance, recognizing that many are founded upon important policy 
considerations.318 At the same time, this proposal seeks to curb parental 
disinheritance when, regardless of the motivation, the disinheritance 
would result in abuse or neglect. 
Second, even among those children protected by this proposal, the law 
would only disregard an attempt at disinheritance if the parent had 
otherwise failed to meet his or her obligations to the child. Thus, unlike 
the forced heirship model, which provides children with a set percentage 
regardless of need, this proposal would instead affirmatively take into 
account the broader actions of the testator. Thus, the focus would not rest 
simply upon whether the testator parent failed to provide for the child in 
whatever testamentary document the testator executed, but whether the 
parent had discharged these obligations in some other manner. For 
instance, a parent may attempt to provide for the child in another way—
perhaps through an inter vivos disposition319 or through a sufficient 
bequest to the child’s other legal parent, someone who would in fact have 
a legal duty to provide for the child.320 
2. Promoting Consistency with Current Exceptions 
Regardless of how minimally this proposal might curtail testamentary 
freedom, it is a curtailment all the same. Nonetheless, it is the contention 
of this Article that, aside from being necessary, this exception is likewise 
consistent with the existing limitations American law has imposed upon 
the dead hand. As Lawrence Friedman points out in his book, Dead 
Hands: A Social History of Wills, Trusts, and Inheritance Law, “[o]ur 
legal system allows the dead to control the living,” but only “up to a 
point.”321 More specifically, Daniel Kelly has noted that “[w]hile 
generally permitting the intentional disinheritance of children, American 
succession law does restrict the freedom of testation in other situations 
involving externalities.”322 It does so with the understanding that, in those 
                                                   
318. See supra notes 100–110 and accompanying text. 
319. See Mary M. Wenig, The Marital Property Law of Connecticut: Past, Present and Future, 
1990 WIS. L. REV. 807, 855 (1990) (listing a number of testamentary substitutes individuals can 
effectuate during their life: “inter vivos trust with reserved life estate and power of appointment; 
revocable inter vivos trust; life insurance; . . . IRAs and nonqualified retirement plans; pay-on-death 
U.S. bonds and other P.O.D. contractual benefits; and even a deed deliverable to grantee only on death 
of grantor.”). 
320. See BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW, supra note 132, at 105 (“A parent who disinherits his 
minor child may provide for the child outside the probate process through inter vivos trusts, life 
insurance policies, payable-on-death accounts, and the like.”).  
321. FRIEDMAN, supra note 66, at 125. 
322. Kelly, supra note 35, at 1162. 
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situations, “effectuating donative intent might be inconsistent with 
maximizing social welfare.”323 
One such external cost involves the disinheritance of one’s spouse. As 
noted earlier, in every state but one the surviving spouse “is the only 
person in the family who cannot be disinherited.”324 A number of 
justifications have been put forth for this protection, including the 
“economic partnership of marriage theory”325 and the mutual duties of 
support that spouses owe one another.326 The primary justification, 
however, appears to be the state’s interest in preventing the surviving 
spouse from becoming a ward of the state.327 Or, as one court put it, “[t]he 
legislative purpose behind the elective share statute is to protect the family 
unit from becoming society’s ward by preventing impoverishment of the 
surviving spouse.”328 
Of course, the family unit also encompasses children, and thus, the 
rationales for preventing spouses from becoming wards of the state should 
apply with equal force to at least some categories of children. 
Furthermore, an individual “might reduce or exclude his or her allocation 
to a spouse or children, depending on public support to take up the slack. 
This externality might justify a stipulation that some minimum fraction of 
property be given to spouses and children.”329 The most frequent 
justification for not including children in this scheme is the assumption 
that the surviving spouse would have a legal duty to support minor 
children and, thus, the elective share would result in a “trickle down” 
benefit to the children.330 Again, however, with the changing American 
family, that assumption is increasingly at odds with reality given that 
increased incidences of divorce, remarriage, and cohabitation have made 
it such that the testator’s surviving spouse is less likely to be the second 
parent to the testator’s surviving children.331 
                                                   
323. Id. at 1161. 
324. FRIEDMAN, supra note 66, at 181; see also supra notes 75–80 and accompanying text. 
325. Batts, supra note 1, at 1199; see also Taite, supra note 31, at 341 (“Protecting spouses from 
disinheritance is based . . . . [in part] on the partnership theory, [which] is founded on the principle 
that parties to the marriage contribute in various ways to the success of the marriage.”). 
326. See Waggoner, supra note 116, at 251 (“Another theoretical basis for elective-share law is 
that the spouses’ mutual duties of support during their joint lifetimes should be continued in some 
form after death in favor of the survivor.”). 
327. See Batts, supra note 1, at 1199 (noting the “overriding state concern that the surviving spouse 
does not become a ward of the state”). 
328. Williams v. Williams, 517 S.E.2d 689, 691 (S.C. 1999) (citing Berkebile v. Outen, 426 S.E.2d 
760, 763 (S.C. 1993)). 
329. SHAVELL, supra note 55, at 65 (emphasis added). 
330. See supra notes 101–102 and accompanying text. 
331. See supra notes 258–263 and accompanying text. 
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Children today are arguably even more deserving than spouses of being 
protected against disinheritance given the inability of children to 
safeguard their own interests: 
The surviving spouse is an autonomous, competent adult who 
voluntarily entered into a family relationship with the testator. 
Moreover, that surviving spouse has the ability to protect herself 
from disinheritance during the testator’s lifetime by various 
contractual devices such as antenuptial or postnuptial agreements, 
will contracts, life insurance, as well as by various property 
arrangements . . . . Paradoxically, all states but one provide the 
disinherited minor child—who had no choice concerning his 
existence and who is unable to provide for himself—with no 
direct protection from disinheritance.332 
Thus, not only has the law of succession already carved out exceptions 
for family members, but the policies underlying the protections afforded 
spouses apply with equal (if not more) force to extending those 
protections to children. 
Additionally, the existing law of succession protects some who are not 
even members of the testator’s family—specifically creditors. One of the 
essential functions of probate law is to protect creditors by requiring 
payment of debts,333 and those debts are to be paid even before property 
is distributed to the decedent’s heirs. As Blackstone said, “it is [the 
executor’s] business first of all to see whether there is a sufficient fund 
left to pay the debts of the testator: the rule of equity being, that a man 
must be just, before he is permitted to be generous[.]”334 Thus, just as the 
law of succession protects spouses, it likewise protects creditors due in 
large part to the fact that “[t]he nonpayment of a decedent’s debts, 
including the ability to circumvent creditors at death, would impose harm 
on others and increase the costs of financing during life.”335 
Beyond simply providing an illustration of how testamentary freedom 
is not absolute, the law’s treatment of creditors calls into question why a 
testator’s obligation to support his or her children is not counted as a debt 
that survives the testator’s death. After all, “[s]urely a parent is just as 
responsible for his child’s existence as he is for the debts he incurs.”336 
While the parent is living, the law seems to agree.337 Indeed, the law 
                                                   
332. Brashier, Protecting the Child, supra note 16, at 12–13 (footnotes omitted). 
333. See SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 111, at 44 (including “protect[ing] creditors by providing 
a procedure for payment of the decedent’s debts” as one of the “three core functions” of probate). 
334. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 512. 
335. Kelly, supra note 35, at 1163. 
336. Brashier, Protecting the Child, supra note 16, at 5 n.21. 
337. See supra notes 272–273 and accompanying text. 
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imposes upon parents an affirmative duty to support their dependent 
children, and that is true whether the dependency stems from the child’s 
minority or “the adult child [who] is so mentally or physically disabled 
that he [or she] cannot support himself or herself.”338 Upon death, 
however, the testator parent can disinherit the dependent child, shifting 
the obligation of support to the state.339 Thus, just as allowing testators to 
avoid traditional debts would push those costs off onto society, so too does 
permitting testators to use death as a means of avoiding financial 
obligations to their children. Although some states do enforce a child 
support order against the estate of deceased parent,340 such protections 
only benefit those children who received such an order while the parent 
was living. Additionally, minor children cannot secure such orders on 
their own but are dependent upon another adult to obtain it for them.341 
Thus, given their inability to protect themselves, minor children have even 
greater need for protections than do creditors. 
Finally, the law of succession has not only carved out exceptions for 
certain individuals, but also for testamentary schemes that violate certain 
public policies.342 As noted earlier, the current list includes illegal activity, 
racial restrictions, and provisions designed to encourage divorce or 
separation—each of which would produce harmful externalities.343 State 
laws requiring parents to support their children and, at the same time, 
refrain from harming them are likewise designed to avoid harmful 
externalities, including the desire to keep children from becoming wards 
of the state and, perhaps even more so, to safeguard the health of 
civilization’s future adults.344 As noted sociologist W.J. Goode explains, 
The earliest moral and ethical writings suggest that a society loses 
its strength if people fail in their family 
obligations . . . . [P]hilosophers, reformers, and religions, as well 
as secular leaders, have throughout history been at least implicitly 
aware of the importance of family patterns as a central element in 
the social structure.345 
                                                   
338. Penney v. Penney, 785 So. 2d 376, 378 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000) (citing Beavers v. Beavers, 717 
So. 2d 373 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997)).  
339. See supra section I.A.; see also Asadorian, supra note 22, at 122 (noting that the obligation to 
support one’s children “is one of the few financial obligations that appears to disappear at death”). 
340. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
341. See BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW, supra note 132, at 110 (pointing out that “someone must 
take an affirmative step on behalf of the child to obtain a support agreement or decrees since the 
young child is unable to make these demands herself” (emphasis added)). 
342. See Kelly, supra note 35, at 1162 (listing exceptions). 
343. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
344. See supra notes 228–231 and accompanying text. 
345. W.J. GOODE, THE FAMILY 1–2 (1964). 
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Thus, the proposal at hand would merely require states to recognize 
that the list of public policies that limit testamentary freedom should be 
expanded to include the existing policies designed to safeguard children 
vis-à-vis their parents. To add to that list testamentary provisions that 
operate as parental abuse or neglect would not only be consistent with the 
purposes behind the public policy exception to testamentary freedom but 
would also make the law of succession consistent with all the other areas 
of law that do recognize the state’s parens patriae authority to protect 
American children from harm. The law’s continuing refusal to do 
otherwise—all in the name of preserving testamentary freedom—is 
simply without justification. 
In sum, the evolving American family has created situations in which 
children are now more than ever at risk of being disinherited, including 
those children who are particularly vulnerable to the harms of 
disinheritance. For that reason, the law requires some mechanism through 
which courts, pursuant to their parens patriae obligations, can protect 
those for whom disinheritance would amount to parental abuse or neglect. 
The solution is not, as other countries have done, to outlaw all child 
disinheritance given that there does exist some important policy rationales 
supporting the rights of parents to disinherit their children. Instead, the 
law requires a more tailored approach—one that permits the courts to 
intervene where necessary to protect those most in need without unduly 
limiting testamentary freedom. What follows is a suggested approach to 
how a court might use its inherent parens patriae authority to craft just 
such a rule. 
IV. INCORPORATING PARENS PATRIAE INTO THE LAW 
OF  DISINHERITANCE 
Within the law of domestic relations, it is undisputed that the right to 
direct the upbringing of one’s children must sometimes yield to the state’s 
interest as parens patriae.346 It is the position of this Article that so too 
                                                   
346. Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, parents do possess a fundamental right to direct 
the upbringing of their children—a right that can be traced to two Supreme Court opinions in the 
1920s. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
Interestingly enough, the Court in both cases ruled that the state had unconstitutionally interfered with 
parental rights. Nothing in those opinions, however, suggests that this parental right is subject to strict 
scrutiny. Kyle Still, Comment, Smith’s Hybrid Rights Doctrine and the Pierce Right: An Unintelligent 
Design, 85 N.C. L. REV. 385, 396 (2006) (“Furthermore, as in Meyer, the Court in Pierce used the 
language of rational basis, [and as such,] . . . . Meyer and Pierce are distinct from cases dealing with 
other fundamental rights, which generally are treated with strict scrutiny.”). Indeed, by 1944, the 
Court would state that “[a]cting to guard the general interest in youth’s well being, [sic] the state as 
parens patriae may restrict the parent’s control by requiring school attendance, regulating or 
prohibiting the child’s labor, and in many other ways.” Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 
(1944) (footnotes omitted). For a longer discussion of the constitutional tension between parental 
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must the right to disinherit one’s children yield when that disinheritance 
would operate as a form of child abuse or neglect. In such instances, 
judges should employ their inherent parens patriae authority and refuse to 
give effect to the parent’s attempt to disinherit the child. The theory being 
that courts cannot allow parental actions that harm the child, which in the 
disinheritance context includes withholding necessary parental support as 
well as perpetuating a pattern of child abuse. The remainder of this Part 
discusses the basic contours of such an exception, how it would apply to 
the three categories of vulnerable child heirs, and responses to some of 
the objections this proposal is likely to engender. 
A. The Basic Approach 
Under this proposal, a child would have to satisfy three basic 
requirements in order to set aside a parent’s attempt at disinheritance. 
First, the child would have to establish that he or she qualifies as either a 
minor child, an adult child who remains dependent upon his or her parents 
as a result of disability, or an adult child who was abused by the testator 
parent during the child’s minority. As explained earlier, the proposal 
limits the class of children to these three in an attempt to preserve the 
testamentary freedom of parents yet, at the same time, carve out 
protections for those children who stand to suffer the most harm as a result 
of being disinherited.347 
Second, the child would have to establish that the testamentary 
document does in fact disinherit the child. In instances where the parent 
affirmatively states that the child is to receive nothing, this requirement 
will pose little difficulty. Some parents, however, may be tempted to 
bequeath the child some token amount in an attempt to thwart the child’s 
ability to successfully challenge the bequest. Accordingly, in this context, 
“disinherit” would also have to encompass situations where the amount 
the parent left the child is so small as to, in effect, qualify as a 
disinheritance. Two possibilities exist for how states might make such a 
determination. The first is simply to compare the value of what the parent 
did bequeath the child to what the child would have inherited had the 
parent died intestate. Any deviation below a certain percentage set by the 
state would then count as a disinheritance. Second, for vulnerable child 
heirs for whom the parent had a continuing duty of support, the state might 
                                                   
rights and parens patriae, see Michael J. Higdon, The Quasi-Parent Conundrum, 90 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 941, 979 (2019). 
347. See supra section III.A. The doctrine of parens patriae, of course, protects not only children 
but all vulnerable citizens. Id. Accordingly, although this proposal is limited to those who qualify as 
the testator’s legal children, states might over time decide to expand this proposal to other dependents, 
such as informally adopted children or aging parents. 
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borrow from its approach to child support determinations and establish 
guidelines for calculating the amount of support that parents, upon their 
death, owe vulnerable child heirs.348 Anything below that amount would 
then be considered a disinheritance. 
Finally, even if disinherited, the vulnerable child heir would still have 
to show that the disinheritance constitutes abuse or neglect. To prevail 
under this requirement, both minor children and also adult children who 
remain dependent upon the testator parent would have to establish that the 
parent has failed to otherwise discharge the duty of support owed the 
child. For instance, the parent might have done so by way of an inter vivos 
trust or gift. Additionally, states might continue to allow disinheritance if 
the testator bequeathed a sufficient amount of property to the child’s other 
parent so long as that parent was subject to an affirmative duty to provide 
for the child in question.349 In some circumstances, courts might even take 
into account whether someone other than the testator parent had already 
provided for the child to such an extent that, at the time the testator dies, 
disinheritance would not jeopardize the vulnerable child’s interests. For 
example, a grandparent or other relative might have already set up a 
sizable trust fund that fully satisfies the child’s needs. 
Of course, for courts to engage in an analysis of this sort, they may 
potentially have to consider extrinsic evidence, which could be 
problematic given that some states have been reluctant to look beyond the 
four-corners of a testamentary document to ascertain the testator’s 
intent.350 To remedy that problem, states need only adopt a rule that allows 
courts to consider extrinsic evidence regarding whether a testator parent 
had otherwise satisfied their support obligation to a vulnerable child heir. 
States have taken a similar approach in the past regarding pretermission 
statutes, which are designed to protect children from accidental 
disinheritance.351 Even if states were unwilling to go that far, however, 
they could simply require that testators who wish to disinherit a vulnerable 
child heir must include an explanation in the testamentary document as to 
                                                   
348. See generally Molly E. Christy, Unjust and Inequitable: An Argument Against Strict 
Application of the Child Support Guidelines When the Obligor Parent and Child Live in Different 
Countries, 20 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 260, 262–67 (2007) (discussing the evolution and current 
operation of child support guidelines in the United States). 
349. Other scholars who have proposed changes to the American approach to disinheritance have 
included similar provisions. See, e.g., Batts, supra note 1, at 1258 (proposing that “if the testator has 
provided for all children by means other than estate assets so that the children would receive their 
equivalent share by these nonestate means, the proposal would be satisfied”).  
350. See Kristine S. Knaplund, Postmortem Conception and A Father’s Last Will, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 
91, 114 (2004) (“Because the best evidence of the testator’s intent, the testator, is dead when the will 
is probated, courts have ‘traditionally been reluctant to allow extrinsic evidence in interpreting 
wills.’”) (internal quotations omitted). 
351. See, e.g., In re Estate of Richardson, 50 P.3d 584, 587 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002) (“[E]xtrinsic 
evidence may be admitted to show an heir was unintentionally omitted.”). 
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why the parent felt he or she had otherwise sufficiently provided for the 
child. For those testators who neglect to include that explanation or whose 
explanation fails to convince the court that the disinheritance would not 
amount to abuse or neglect, only then would the court refuse to enforce 
the attempted disinheritance. 
When it comes to adult survivors of abuse, however, the abuse and 
neglect determination would require some additional showings. After all, 
the theory of recovery there is not so much that the parent is neglecting 
their duty of support to a dependent child, but that the court cannot, 
pursuant to its role as parens patriae, endorse an attempt at disinheritance 
that is in furtherance of abuse inflicted upon the child by the testator 
during the child’s minority. Thus, at a minimum, adult survivors of child 
abuse would need to demonstrate more than the mere fact they were an 
abused child whose parent had failed to provide for them at death. First, 
they would likely need to demonstrate that the abuse began during their 
minority given that state policies of protecting children from abuse are 
aimed primarily at minor children.352 Next, the adult survivor would need 
to establish that this abuse occurred at the hands of the testator and also 
that the attempt at disinheritance is in furtherance of or a product of that 
abuse. Because of the time that has likely elapsed since the abuse occurred 
as well as the difficulties in even defining “abuse,”353 it could be quite 
difficult to prove these elements. Nonetheless, proof problems alone 
should not be a basis for denying even the possibility of recovery to those 
whose childhood abuse continues into adulthood in the form of 
adult  disinheritance.354 
                                                   
352. Additionally, “[d]espite the high incidence of child abuse, the majority of adult children [are] 
not abused.” Lara Q. Plaisance, Will You Still . . . When I’m Sixty-Four: Adult Children’s Legal 
Obligations to Aging Parents, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 245, 266–67 (2008). This is not to 
say that states cannot protect children from disinheritance when they were abused by the testator as 
an adult. Just as many states have passed laws preventing perpetrators of elder abuse from inheriting 
from their victims, states could pass similar legislation for testators who abused their adult children. 
See generally Nina A. Kohn, Elder (In)justice: A Critique of the Criminalization of Elder Abuse, 49 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2012). The point here is merely that a court may have difficult imposing such 
a rule given the degree to which parens patriae authorizes court intervention on behalf of minor 
children. See generally Lisa C. Dumond, Comment, The Undeserving Heir: Domestic Elder Abuser’s 
Right to Inherit, 23 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 214 (2010). 
353. See Donald N. Duquette, Child Protection Legal Process: Comparing the United States and 
Great Britain, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 239, 241 (1992) (“[The definition of what actually constitutes child 
abuse and neglect is not clear within a particular country, much less uniform from one society to 
another.” (emphasis omitted)). 
354. Consider for instance the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Most agree that it is 
quite hard for a plaintiff to establish the necessary elements, yet nonetheless the cause of action remains 
available. See Alan Calnan & Andrew E. Taslitz, Defusing Bomb-Blast Terrorism: A Legal Survey of 
Technological and Regulatory Alternatives, 67 TENN. L. REV. 177, 231 (1999) (noting that IIED is “very 
difficult to prove”). 
A somewhat related example can be found in how courts have dealt with claims by adult children who 
allege that their parents sexually abused them as children. As a result of repressed memories, many adult 
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Even in the case of a former abused child, the question arises as to 
whether one can ever know for certain why a testator disinherited a child. 
After all, the disinheritance could have been for some other reason. Few 
testators would be so bold as to openly declare that their intent was to heap 
additional abuse on their children. One solution would simply be to 
employ a rebuttable presumption that might operate as follows: if a child 
can establish by clear and convincing evidence that he or she was abused 
by the testator parent during the child’s minority, then the court will 
presume that the disinheritance was a product of that abuse, giving the 
proponent of the will an opportunity to then rebut that presumption with 
evidence that the disinheritance was for some unrelated reason. Assuming 
the child could satisfy all the three requirements—for instance, that the 
child qualifies as a vulnerable child heir, that the testator did disinherit the 
child, and that the disinheritance would amount to abuse or neglect—the 
court would not enforce the disinheritance. 
As to the remedy, the simplest solution would be to award the child an 
intestate share. The law already offers a similar remedy, under the 
pretermission statutes, for those children who were inadvertently 
excluded from a will. Consider, for instance, the New Hampshire 
pretermission statute which provides that “Every child . . . not named or 
referred to in his will, and who is not a devisee or legatee, shall be entitled 
to the same portion of the estate, real and personal, as he would be if the 
deceased were intestate.”355 Or, as noted earlier, the states could establish 
support guidelines, like those used for determining child support, to help 
calculate the appropriate remedy for dependent children whose parents 
attempted to disinherit them.356 Just as child support guidelines take into 
account a number of considerations, so too would guidelines for this 
purpose. Variables to consider would include the child’s age, the size of 
the estate, the number of other surviving children, and whether the testator 
died leaving a spouse. A final benefit to establishing such guidelines 
would be—in contrast to the family maintenance approach adopted by a 
                                                   
children do not even become aware of the abuse until much later in life when the statute of limitations might 
have elapsed. See generally Jodi Leibowitz, Criminal Statutes of Limitations: An Obstacle to the Prosecution 
and Punishment of Child Sexual Abuse, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 907 (2003). In response, many states have 
tolled the statute of limitations in such instances recognizing that 
the doctrine of delayed discovery may be applied in a case where plaintiff can establish lack of memory 
of tortious acts due to psychological repression which took place before plaintiff attained the age of 
majority, and which caused plaintiff to forget the facts of the acts of abuse until a date subsequent to 
which the complaint is timely filed.  
Mary D. v. John D., 264 Cal. Rptr. 633, 639 (Ct. App. 1989), superseded by 788 P.2d 1155 (Cal. 1990). 
355. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 551:10 (2020). 
356. See Christy, supra note 348 and accompanying text; see also Taite, supra note 31, at 330 (noting 
how, when it comes to child support, America follows “the continuity-of-expendeture model,” which 
“operates from either the percentage-of-obligor-income formula or the income-shares formula”). 
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number of countries—the greater certainty and consistency it would 
afford to those entitled to recovery.357 
B. Potential Objections 
The foregoing suggestions are an attempt to delineate the broad 
contours of how a parens patriae exception to testamentary freedom might 
operate—one aimed at protecting the state’s most vulnerable children 
from the harms of disinheritance. Were courts to implement such an 
exception, however, it is unreasonable to expect they could do so without 
some degree of opposition and objection. The chief criticism would likely 
be the degree to which such an approach would curtail testamentary 
freedom. As explained earlier, however, that impact is relatively minor 
and, at the same time, is consistent with other limitations the law has 
imposed on testamentary freedom.358 Nonetheless, even if that overall 
objection can be overcome, the implementation of such an exception is 
likely to give rise to even further questions, and it is the goal of this section 
to both identify what they might be as well as provide some 
potential  responses. 
One of the initial concerns that would need to be addressed relates to 
entitlement. Specifically, if children are not entitled to inherit from their 
parents, how can one justify an approach whereby courts refuse to enforce 
certain attempts at disinheritance? There are two potential responses. One 
would be to simply characterize this proposal as abolishing the precept 
that children are never entitled to an inheritance. The impact of the 
proposal, after all, would be that vulnerable child heirs are in fact entitled 
to inherit some amount from their parents absent some indication that the 
parent has otherwise discharged his or her obligation to the child. The goal 
of this Article, however, is to take a position that is a bit more nuanced: 
namely, even if children are in no way entitled to an inheritance from their 
parents, the state still cannot be complicit in any attempt by parents to 
abuse or neglect their children, and that includes certain attempts at 
disinheritance. Thus, this proposal does not really change the landscape 
of entitlement vis-á-vis disinheritance, but more precisely, it delineates 
when the state can and cannot, as parens patriae, play a role in enforcing 
that disinheritance. 
A second objection that would likely need to be addressed is the extent 
to which this proposal would invite litigation. Disinheritance is disruptive 
enough when it comes to family harmony, but a will contest brought by a 
                                                   
357. See supra notes 170–176 and accompanying text. 
358. See supra section III.B. 
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family member can be even more damaging.359 The proposal outlined 
herein would certainly encourage some disinherited heirs to bring actions 
in which they allege a number of things, including that whatever the parent 
did bequeath them was inadequate to fulfill the parent’s support 
obligations, that the child is disabled and thus incapable of being 
disinherited, or perhaps most damaging, that the parent abused the child 
during the child’s minority and is thus precluded from now disinheriting 
the adult child. No doubt some such claims would be frivolous, perhaps 
brought by disgruntled children solely as means of forcing a settlement 
with the estate.360 The first response to such concerns would be that, as 
detailed earlier, the exception is limited to three classes of children 
individuals who find themselves in fairly specific circumstances.361 As 
such, concerns about this exception to testamentary freedom giving rise 
to rampant litigation are likely unwarranted. Second, regardless of how 
much litigation a proposal such as this might generate, the reality is that 
any exception to testamentary freedom will invite litigation. Nonetheless, 
the law of succession already contains a number of exceptions, each of 
which have no doubt resulted in a number of divisive, perhaps even 
frivolous, lawsuits.362 Those exceptions exist, however, because the law 
has decided that the protections they offer outweigh such concerns. It is 
the position of this Article that, at the very least, the need for an exception 
that protects vulnerable child heirs from disinheritance rises to that 
same  level. 
Finally, there are the questions of whether this proposal goes far 
enough and, relatedly, whether it is somewhat myopic to focus so heavily 
on the financial harms of disinheritance. After all, being disinherited by 
one’s parent is likely harmful regardless of the child’s age, needs, or past 
                                                   
359. See Jeffrey P. Rosenfeld, Will Contests: Legacies of Aging and Social Change, in 
INHERITANCE AND WEALTH IN AMERICA 173, 174 (Robert K. Miller Jr. & Stephen J. McNamee, eds. 
2013) (“Will contests are socially and economically significant events. . . . They can rupture and 
realign the social fabric of families and keep millions of dollars tied up in litigation for 
years . . . [They] often involve large estates and can create decades of ill will in families.”). 
360. Or by the parents of those disgruntled heirs. See Brashier, Modern Family, supra note 18, at 
173 (“A vengeful ex-spouse or ex-lover of the testator would be tempted to expose the testator’s dirty 
laundry in the process of ensuring that her disinherited child by the testator received a satisfactory 
maintenance award.”). 
361. See supra section III.B.1. 
362. For instance, disgruntled heirs can bring claims in which they attempt to prove that the testator 
lacked capacity or suffered from an insane delusion. See generally Adam J. Hirsch, Testation and the 
Mind, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285, 286 (2017) (discussing insane delusion and capacity). 
Disgruntled heirs are also currently permitted to try and block a bequest to a third party on the basis 
that the third party exerted undue influence on the testator, or, in some states, committed elder abuse. 
Id.; see also, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 259(a)(1)–(4) (West 2011) (stating that a person is deemed to 
have predeceased a decedent if it is proven that the person is liable for physical abuse of the elder 
adult). Any of these claims could involve unseemly facts that could further disrupt family harmony. 
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history with the parent.363 And in many instances that harm may be more 
psychological than financial. One might object to this Article’s proposal 
as giving too short a shrift to the psychological harm of disinheritance—
a particularly poignant criticism given that, under parens patriae, courts 
attempt to protect children from a number of harms including emotional 
abuse. Thus, perhaps one might argue that an approach like the forced 
heirship or family maintenance statutes is more appropriate given that 
they have the ability to protect all children.364 That objection is a more 
difficult one to resolve because extending the exception that far would 
represent a dramatic shift to America’s long-standing rules regarding 
succession.365 Of course, tradition alone should not dictate current 
practice.366 Nonetheless, it is the position of this Article that the American 
approach to permitting child disinheritance is grounded upon important 
considerations, and a wholesome overthrow of those principles might not 
be in anyone’s best interest. As Daniel Kelly has persuasively argued: 
[D]isregarding donative intent may harm the donees themselves. 
In response to the possibility of legal intervention, a donor may 
alter her behavior. For example, if D believes courts will not 
facilitate her intent, D may consume more during life. If D owns 
less property at death, the donees will inherit less wealth. 
Moreover, if D anticipates that a court will intervene and ignore 
her intent, D may alter her disposition by making a gift during 
life, choosing different donees, or forgoing the gift entirely.367 
Thus, the proposal outlined above is believed to safeguard those 
concerns and yet, at the same time, provide sorely needed protection for 
America’s growing population of particularly vulnerable children. 
CONCLUSION 
The rights of children to receive support from their parents and to be 
shielded from parental abuse must supersede the law’s solicitude for “the 
dead hand.”368 Although the United States has always permitted testators 
to disinherit their children—regardless of age, need, or justification—
society has changed and with it so too must the law of succession. By 
permitting any parent to disinherit any child, the United States has 
                                                   
363. See Taite, supra note 31, at 345 (“Because disinheriting a child is generally perceived as an 
unnatural act, children may view this act as a betrayal.”). 
364. See supra section I.B. 
365. See supra section I.A. 
366. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (stating that we 
must respect “our history and learn[] from it without allowing the past alone to rule the present”). 
367. Kelly, supra note 35, at 1129. 
368. See, e.g., J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 99 (1997) (“Though we appear to 
respect the intentions of the dead, we may be fools to do so.”). 
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expressed a willingness to put a certain percentage of children at risk of 
suffering abuse or neglect at the hands of their testator parent. However, 
with the evolving American family—particularly the increase in divorce, 
remarriage, and cohabitation—that possibility has increased drastically, 
and thus the likelihood of such abuse and neglect has now grown. Thus, 
the United States can no longer ignore the fact that, when it comes to the 
ability of a testator to disinherit his or her children, wholesale 
testamentary freedom simply cannot coexist with the state’s parens patriae 
responsibility to protect its most vulnerable citizens. 
Recognizing the role that the doctrine of parens patriae plays in this 
context not only illuminates the dangers and limitations of the current 
approach, but also offers a solution—one that more effectively balances 
the need for some degree of testamentary freedom with the duty of the 
state to protect needy children from abuse and neglect. This Article has 
attempted to sketch out the broad contours of what a parens patriae 
exception to testamentary freedom might look like. However, regardless 
of the precise form it takes, it is imperative that states begin to implement 
some solution to the problem of child disinheritance. To instead ignore 
this growing threat to American children would not only continue to 
elevate the property interests of the dead over those of the living, but 
would in fact give the dead hand even greater power, bestowing upon it a 
right that no living person would ever be permitted to exercise—the right 
to intentionally abuse or neglect his or her children. 
 
